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ARTICLES
PENAL INCAPACITATION: A SITUATIONIST CRITIQUE

Guyora Binder* & Ben Notterman**
INTRODUCTION
Objects or ends of penal justice . . .: 1st, Example—prevention of similar
offences . . . by the repulsive infuence exercised on the minds of bystanders
by the apprehension of similar suffering in case of similar delinquency. 2dly,
Reformation—prevention of similar offences on the part of the particular
individual punished . . . by curing him of the will to do the like in future.
3rdly, Incapacitation—prevention of similar offences on the part of the same
individual, by depriving him of the power to do the like.1

As we today look back at the infamous cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford2 and
Plessy v. Ferguson3 to understand the ideologies of slavery and racial segregation,
so too will later generations look to Ewing v. California4 to understand mass
incarceration. In Ewing, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
sentence of twenty-fve years-to-life for stealing three golf clubs, under California’s infamous “Three Strikes and You’re Out” recidivist sentencing law.5 In
holding this harsh sentence proportionate, the Court determined that sentences of
imprisonment could be justifed by the goal of incapacitation alone, without
requiring any empirical evidence that such sentences would in fact reduce crime.6
Instead, the Court simply assumed that locking up a prior offender would prevent
crime that would otherwise occur.7 So, as we increased our incarcerated population
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1. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Panopticon vs. New South Wales, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 173, 174 (John
Bowring ed., 1843).
2. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 25.
7. See infra Part III (discussing the assumptions underlying incapacitation theory).
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700%,8 what were we thinking? The answer Ewing v. California suggests is that
we thought we were incapacitating dangerous offenders.9 This Article argues that
we were fundamentally mistaken. We were not incapacitating danger, but attributing it to individuals. We were not reducing the risk of crime, but redistributing it.
In two recent cases, Graham v. Florida10 and Miller v. Alabama,11 the Supreme
Court changed the landscape of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence by requiring a
more searching proportionality review of certain sentences of incarceration.
Challenges to sentencing practices (as opposed to individual sentences) required a
comparison of the severity of the authorized sentences to the gravity of the crimes
punished.12 In making this comparison, the Court considered proportionality to all
purposes of punishment cumulatively—retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
incapacitation.13 Moreover, it subjected incapacitation rationales to a test of
empirical evidence.14 These decisions undermine the continued authority of Ewing
and its uncritical acceptance of incapacitation as a justifcation for very long
sentences. If such sentences cannot be shown to prevent crime, they may no longer
satisfy the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
Incapacitation was frst identifed as a function of punishment by utilitarian
philosopher and legal reformer Jeremy Bentham.15 For Bentham, public policy
was best evaluated by its contribution to public utility, the maximum expected net
aggregate pleasure of all members of society.16 From this utilitarian perspective,
punishment was an evil, reducing utility by inficting suffering.17 It could be
justifed only insofar as it prevented more suffering by preventing crime.18
Accordingly, incapacitation justifes incarceration, only insofar as it reduces
crimes overall, and at an acceptable social cost. If, as its critics claim, mass
incarceration imposes unacceptable economic and social costs, it cannot fulfll the
8. LAUREN-BROOKE EISEN & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE REVERSE MASS INCARACT 3 (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fles/publications/The_Reverse_Mass_
Incarceration_Act%20.pdf (noting America’s prison population grew 700% since 1970).
9. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30 (“[Ewing’s sentence] refects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference,
that offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be
incapacitated.”).
10. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
11. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
12. See id. at 2463; Graham, 560 U.S. at 67–68.
13. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72.
14. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465; Graham, 560 U.S. at 71–72. This Article focuses primarily on
proportionality in the Court’s noncapital cases; incapacitation has effectively been removed from consideration as
a penological justifcation for capital punishment, see Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (fnding
incapacitation “largely irrelevant” to analysis of state executions), though proportionality analysis itself is no
longer easily divided into capital and non-capital settings.
15. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF
CRIME 19–21 (1995).
16. Guyora Binder, Foundations of the Legislative Panopticon: Bentham’s Principles of Morals and Legislation, in FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS IN MODERN CRIMINAL LAW 79, 79–83 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2014).
17. See id.
18. See id.
CERATION
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aim of incapacitation, which is to maximize utility. Although incapacitation is a
possible function of punishment, incapacitation can also be pursued by other
means. Thus, individuals can be restrained preventively, without their having
committed any crime. Moreover, incapacitation need not be directed at particular
individuals, let alone past offenders. Locks, surveillance cameras, and passwords
are examples of incapacitation strategies directed generally at populations. These
strategies make crime less likely by changing the situation confronting anyone
who might otherwise commit it. Thus, penal incapacitation measures are a subset
of incapacitation measures. The goal of incapacitation can only justify punishment
insofar as restraining particular past offenders will prevent crimes that would
otherwise occur, without causing greater harm than the crime prevented or any
alternative means of preventing crime.
This Article examines incapacitation as a justifcation for punishment. It focuses
this inquiry through the prism of a generation of research in psychology on the
relative importance of situation and character (or “disposition”) in accounting for
behavior. It argues that incapacitation of past offenders is fundamentally fawed as
a rationale for punishment. The problems with penal incapacitation are both
conceptual and empirical. As a method of crime control, penal incapacitation is
necessarily dispositionalist.19 It presupposes that past offenders are uniquely
dangerous individuals who are destined to offend and re-offend regardless of
social context. This assumption, however, must contend with empirical studies
showing that situational forces frequently overwhelm individual disposition; the
causes of crime are often dangerous situations rather than dangerous people.20
With respect to welfare, there is thus little to be gained by incapacitating all
offenders on the basis of their imagined predispositions to offend. What sustains
the illusion that penal incapacitation is welfare-enhancing is the Fundamental
Attribution Error, a pervasive cognitive bias that causes humans to underestimate
the power of situational factors and overemphasize disposition or personality.21
We will acknowledge that there may be a much smaller population of offenders
with discernible dispositions to offend (most of whom would probably be
incarcerated even in a penal regime aimed at goals other than incapacitation). Thus
incapacitation may justify some incarceration, but not mass incarceration.
Penal incapacitation rests on an understanding of behavior that is deeply
inconsistent. Its proponents view offenders as inherently dangerous and likely to
reoffend regardless of where they are put. Yet it also presumes that offenders will
not continue to offend once they are incarcerated. A possible rejoinder is that an
incapacitationist criminal justice system need not prevent crime in prison. The
diffculty with this solution is that it abandons an essential feature of incapacita19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra notes 233–55 and accompanying text.
21. Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, 10
ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 184–87 (1977).
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tion: its utilitarianism. From a utilitarian perspective, the welfare of all persons
counts equally, including that of offenders. There is no purpose served by
imposing suffering on an offender merely to shift additional suffering from one
victim to another. If the purpose of incapacitation is not to reduce crime but to
redistribute it to the guilty, it abandons its claim to advance the public welfare.
Thus conceived, incapacitation is not a distinct rationale for punishment at all, but
instead is a means to retribution. Yet a retributive strategy of redistributing crime to
past offenders must embrace the unpalatable assumption that offenders deserve not
just their prescribed punishment, but also an increased risk of criminal victimization. Moreover, retribution cannot justify sentences like Ewing’s that seem
undeserved. If our current strategy of penal incapacitation serves neither utility nor
desert, it is tempting to interpret it critically, as an ideological practice that
disguises normative judgments (of blame) as facts (about risk). We will argue that
our current practice of penal incapacitation is best understood as a segregation
regime, which both prevents offenders from associating with other members of
society, and stigmatizes them as unworthy to do so. Given our country’s history of
racial segregation and the disproportionately minority composition of the inmate
population, such segregation is not an acceptable use of the criminal justice
system.22
Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I describes the belated emergence of
incapacitation as the dominant aim of criminal justice, and the modern incapacitation strategies that have contributed to mass incarceration. These incapacitation
strategies have included reduced probation and parole, recidivist statutes, and
possession offenses. Part II summarizes the place of incapacitation in the Supreme
Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality review of noncapital sentencing decisions, and reviews the theoretical premises and empirical assumptions of penal
incapacitation. It includes a critical discussion of the methods available to identify
which individuals are disposed to offend in the future. Part III discusses psychology’s attribution theory and offers a situationist critique of penal incapacitation and
its dispositionalist assumptions. It also describes attribution errors and suggests
that the plausibility of incapacitation theory rests on such errors. Part IV offers a
critical reinterpretation of incapacitation as an expressive practice of segregating
and stigmatizing offenders. Part V considers the signifcance of these criticisms of
incapacitation for its place in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. It argues that after
Graham and Miller, the weak theoretical and empirical basis for believing that
mass incarceration can incapacitate should preclude incapacitation from justifying
life terms and other severe sentence enhancements. A brief conclusion summarizes
the argument.

22. See infra Section IV.E.
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I. MODERN INCAPACITATION STRATEGIES
A. The Rise of Incapacitation
Although Bentham identifed “Incapacitation” as one way that punishment
might prevent crime, he considered it far less important than general deterrence,
which could infuence many more potential offenders.23 He identifed incapacitation with transportation, which he mocked as less a means of preventing crime than
of removing it from one place to another.24
Among the early Americans who pioneered the penitentiary, rehabilitation
(“Reform” in Bentham’s terminology) was the primary aim of this new method of
punishment.25 Rehabilitation continued to dominate American penology until the
last quarter of the twentieth century, when support for it suddenly collapsed.26
Throughout this period, incapacitation was seen as a marginal function of punishment, useful only for a small population of incorrigibly dangerous offenders.27 In
the 1960s and 1970s, however, as crime rates rose, rehabilitation came under
attack as paternalistic, arbitrary, potentially discriminatory, and—most devastatingly—ineffectual.28 A study of prison rehabilitative programs entitled “What
Works?” famously concluded that none did.29 Because incapacitation had long
been seen as the default strategy when rehabilitation failed, it flled the void and
became “dominant by default.”30 Liberals continued to insist that incapacitation
was necessary only for a small group of incorrigibly dangerous offenders. In this
sense, they proposed a strategy of selective incapacitation. Yet they offered no
method for selecting these few, and their track record of excessive optimism about
rehabilitative programs seemed to discredit their optimism about offenders themselves.31 In an atmosphere of anxiety about rising crime, the public could easily
confate the failure of rehabilitative programs to affect recidivism rates with the
inevitable recidivism of all offenders. As Zimring and Hawkins commented:
The case for incapacitation at the individual level . . . rest[s] on the premise
that the individual who has offended once will offend again unless restrained.

23. See BENTHAM, supra note 1, at 174.
24. Id. at 184.
25. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 79–108 (1971); Edward L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 LAW & INEQ. 343, 347–52
(2001).
26. Rubin, supra note 25, at 347; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 6–10; Francis A. Allen, The Decline of
the Rehabilitative Ideal in American Criminal Justice, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 147, 149–50 (1978); Albert W.
Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective on the Past Century and Some
Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2003).
27. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 21–25.
28. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 33–34
(1981).
29. Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974).
30. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 3–17.
31. Id. at 10–12.
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The implicit assumption that offenders are intractable and insusceptible to
change serves to justify imprisonment for the purpose of restraint on both
moral and practical grounds. Indeed an image of the criminal offender as
intractable was very much in fashion by the 1990[]s.32

This prevalent image of the intractable offender was infected with racial connotations. Rising crime rates coincided with urban riots and disputes over school
desegregation during the 1960s and 1970s to make crime policy a context for racial
demagoguery. Richard Nixon, George Wallace, and Ronald Reagan made coded
appeals to White resentment by identifying themselves with “law and order” or
referring to city streets as dangerous “jungles.”33 Anti-crime rhetoric also attacked
judges as indifferent to crime victims. The Supreme Court, already under attack for
mandating school desegregation, made itself a target of anti-crime rhetoric by
expanding constitutional safeguards in criminal procedure and restricting the death
penalty.34 Critiques of judicial discretion motivated calls for uniform, determinate
sentencing, culminating in the 1987 Federal Sentencing Guidelines and guideline
schemes in about half the states.35 Parole and probation were increasingly
portrayed as a revolving door, releasing incorrigibly violent offenders to prey on
the public. The 1988 presidential campaign revealed the political potency of this
narrative, as ads for George Bush held Michael Dukakis responsible for a violent
crime committed by a furloughed black prisoner named Willie Horton and showed
prisoners exiting a revolving door.36 California’s 1994 “Three Strikes” law was
propelled by public outrage over another violent crime by a parolee.37
Proponents of incapacitation recognized the public’s taste for higher incarceration rates in the 1970s. James Q. Wilson presciently observed, “Since society
clearly wishes its criminal laws more effectively enforced . . . this means rising
prison populations perhaps for a long period . . . .”38 Wilson therefore proposed a
strategy of collective incapacitation—confning all offenders. He speculated—in
32. Id. at 15.
33. WILLIAM STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 234, 236–39 (2011); JONATHAN SIMON,
GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME 50 (2007).
34. See, e.g., Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exercising The Exclusionary Demons: An Essay on Rhetoric,
Principle, and the Exclusion Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 49, 60–61 (1984); SIMON, supra note 33, at 60–62, 113–26.
35. See Alschuler, supra note 26, at 9–10; Kevin Reitz, Sentencing: Guidelines, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
& JUSTICE 1429, 1429–40 (2002); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND
CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
36. Beth Schwartzappel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (May 13, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-revisited#.Mx6RZ5aqD.
37. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES
AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4–7 (2001) (discussing role of murder of Polly Klaas by parolee Richard Davis in
referendum campaign for this law); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14–15 (2003) (discussing infuence of Polly
Klaas case).
38. Farnsworth Fowle, Study Shows Prison Population Rose 13% in 1976 to Set a Record, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
18, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/1977/02/18/archives/study-shows-prison-population-rose-13-in-1976-to-seta-record.html (quoting James Q. Wilson).
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advance of empirical evidence—that substantial reductions in crime would follow.39 He presented the prospect of these benefts as a matter of common sense, to
be presumed absent contrary evidence:
When criminals are deprived of their liberty, as by imprisonment . . . their
ability to commit offenses against citizens is ended . . . .
...
. . . [T]here is one great advantage to incapacitation as a crime control
strategy—namely it does not require us to make any assumptions about human
nature. By contrast, deterrence works only if people take into account the costs
and benefts of alternative courses of action . . . . Rehabilitation works only if
the values, preferences, or time-horizons of criminals can be altered by
plan . . . .
Incapacitation, on the other hand, works by defnition: its effects result from
the physical restraint placed upon the offender and not from his subjective
state. More accurately, it works provided at least three conditions are met:
some offenders must be repeaters, offenders taken off the streets must not be
immediately and completely replaced by new recruits, and prison must not
increase the post-release criminal activity of those who have been incarcerated
suffciently to offset the crimes prevented by their stay in prison.
The frst condition is surely true . . . . [T]he great majority of persons in
prisons are repeat offenders, and thus prison, whatever else it may do, protects
society from the offenses those persons would commit if they were free.
The second condition . . . seems plausible . . . except, perhaps, for certain
crimes (such as narcotics traffcking or prostitution), which are organized
along business lines. For . . . predatory street crimes—robbery, burglary, auto
theft, larceny—there are no barriers to entry and no scarcity of criminal
opportunities . . . .
. . . In general, there is no evidence that the prison experience makes
offenders as a whole more criminal . . . .40

By setting the bar for success very low in this passage—any net crime prevention—
Wilson was able to argue that unlike rehabilitation, incapacitation was guaranteed
to work. The only pertinent question empirical investigation could answer was
how much. The U.S. Supreme Court essentially accepted that logic of common
sense in Ewing v. California, in deferring to the California Legislature’s “judgment
that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who already
have been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime[,]” without requiring
that this judgment be supported by empirical evidence.41 The haphazard way in
which this legislation was drafted belies any notion that the legislature tailored it to

39. James Q. Wilson, If Every Criminal Knew He Would be Punished if Caught . . ., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 28,
1973), http://www.nytimes.com/1973/01/28/archives/if-every-criminal-knew-he-would-be-punished-if-caughtbut-he-doesnt.html.
40. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145–47 (2d rev. ed.1983) (citation omitted).
41. Ewing, 538 U.S at 29–30.
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empirical fndings.42
Yet even if we accepted that confnement prevented crime by defnition, it would
still be a particularly costly way of doing so, in also preventing all useful activity
by its targets, while maintaining them at public expense.43 If incapacitation is
conceived in utilitarian terms as a strategy for maximizing the social welfare,
incapacitation only succeeds if it costs less than the crime it prevents and all
alternative means of preventing that crime. The high cost of collective incapacitation made the scale of expected prevention matter. While an infuential paper
claimed that imposing a fve-year sentence for every violent offense would reduce
violent crime by 80%,44 later analyses predicted that fve-year mandatory sentences for felonies would reduce felonies by at most 15%—less if the highest-rate
offenders could expect to fnd themselves back in prison within fve years
anyway.45
Criminologists responded to the high cost and modest beneft of collective
incapacitation by trying to make incapacitation more selective. Interviews with
inmates revealed that a high percentage of their crimes had been committed by a
small number of high-rate offenders. It seemed that if these high-rate offenders
could be identifed and selectively confned, incapacitation would be achieved at
less cost. Peter Greenwood and Allan Abrahamse developed a list of biographical
factors—essentially past offending, incarceration, drug use, and unemployment—
that seemed to predict high-rate offending.46 Yet subsequent re-analyses diminished the predictive power of these factors. Moreover, critics pointed to four
mechanisms likely to further reduce the preventive effcacy of selecting offenders
for incapacitation. First, because rules of complicity inculpate multiple offenders
in group crimes, participants in criminal groups tend to be liable for many crimes.
In this sense, they may be high-rate offenders. Yet group offenses will not
generally be prevented by the removal of one member. The number of persons
liable for the offense may decrease (unless another participant is recruited) but the
harm inficted may not. Second, non-prisoners with the predictive factors were
unlikely to offend at the rates of prisoners, since high-rate offending increases the
odds of arrest and imprisonment. Third, for this method of prediction to be applied,
some of the predictive data has to be gathered from offenders, who have no
42. Determined to prevent the Republican Governor from using a recidivist sentencing statute as an election
issue, the Democratic leadership of the legislature committed to pass whatever the Governor proposed. The
Governor proposed language previously offered as a popular initiative. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra
note 37, at 3–7.
43. CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE OF PRISONS: WHAT
INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 9 (2012) (fnding that average per prisoner cost of incarceration in forty states
studied in 2010 was $31,286).
44. Shlomo Shinnar & Reuel Shinnar, The Effects of the Criminal Justice System on the Control of Crime: A
Quantitative Approach, 9 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 581 (1975).
45. Jacqueline Cohen, Incapacitation as a Strategy for Crime Control: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 5 CRIME &
JUST. 1, 27 (1983).
46. PETER W. GREENWOOD & ALLAN ABRAHAMSE, RAND CORP., SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982).

2017]

PENAL INCAPACITATION

9

incentive to supply it. Fourth, in practice, law enforcement personnel are likely to
deploy discretion to resist differential punishments of offenders committing
similar offenses.47
These obstacles to selective incapacitation might have convinced researchers
that incapacitation could not achieve cost-effective prevention. Instead, proponents argued that collective incapacitation would automatically select high-rate
offenders through “stochastic selection,” as higher rate offenders would be more
likely to be arrested and convicted.48 Yet stochastic selection can disproportionately confne high-rate offenders and still confne many more low-rate offenders.
Moreover, the stochastic selection hypothesis presumes that those who have
offended at a high rate in the past will offend at a high rate in the future, without
offering any causal account of offending that could justify that presumption. In
place of a causal theory, it simply assumes that offense rates are traits of
individuals, dispositions that persist, regardless of environment.49
Both selection based on predictive instruments and stochastic selection depend
on this attribution of past offenses to persistent dispositions. As such, both are
equally vulnerable to the group criminality objection, which suggests that highrate offending may depend on environmental rather than dispositional factors.
Evidence indicates that co-offending is high for the offenses of robbery and
burglary—precisely the offenses Wilson assumed would not be subject to a
replacement effect.50 Both prediction and stochastic selection are similarly vulnerable to the argument that by the time offenders are confned, their remaining
criminal careers may be shorter than their sentences. One study found an average
career-length for violent crime of less than ten years.51
Despite the high cost of collective incapacitation and the empirical challenges
facing selective incapacitation, American policymakers pursued incapacitation
enthusiastically. The ensuing sections describe several incapacitative practices that
emerged during the late twentieth century and that continue today: the reduction of
probation and parole; recidivist sentencing enhancements; the increased investigation, prosecution, and punishment of possession offenses; and lengthening prison
terms. Common to these incapacitative practices is an underlying assumption that
offenders offend because of an inherent disposition to do so.

47. See 1 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER CRIMINALS” 134–35 (Alfred Blumstein,
Jacqueline Cohen, Jeffrey A. Roth & Christy Visher, eds., 1986).
48. Alex R. Piquero & Alfred Blumstein, Does Incapacitation Reduce Crime?, 23 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 267, 272–74 (2007); José Canela-Cacho et al., Relationship between the Offending Frequency () of
Imprisoned and Free Offenders, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 133, 133–76 (1997).
49. Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 117
(2012) (“[S]elective incapacitation requires a prospective threat-based approach to sentencing and, in so doing,
treats us as unwavering sources of risk rather than as persons capable of responding to reasons.”).
50. Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 48, at 272–74.
51. Id.
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B. Disappearance of Probation and Parole
Parole and probation arose early in the twentieth century as mechanisms to
rehabilitate offenders.52 Unlike incapacitation, rehabilitation presupposes that
people have the capacity to change. The primary focus of parole programs through
the 1960s was to facilitate reentry by providing employment and housing-related
services.53 The percentage of prisoners released on parole exceeded 70% in
1977.54 As crime-control rhetoric infused American politics in the 1980s and
1990s, parole and probation gave way to determinate sentencing.55 Some states
abolished parole entirely, and many others severely limited its use.56 By 1997, only
28% percent of prisoners were paroled.57
As public attitude and the political climate changed, parole and probation
services began devoting more resources to surveillance and control of parolees.58
No longer avenues toward reintegration, these institutions redirected offenders
back into prison by placing new conditions on offenders, such as curfew and drug
tests.59 The professional orientation of parole offcers shifted, as new recruits
increasingly had training in criminal justice rather than social work.60 Unsurprisingly, parole violations increased drastically: the percentage of state parolees
successfully completing supervision fell from 70% in 1984 to 44% in 1996.61 Now
aided by the use of GPS and DNA technology, revocations continue to be a major
source of recidivism throughout the country.62
C. Recidivist Sentence Enhancements
Recidivist sentencing laws enhance punishment for reoffenders. A wellpublicized example is California’s “three-strikes” law. Under that law, offenders
previously convicted of two or more “serious” or “violent” crimes could be
sentenced to a term of 25 years to life for an additional felony.63 The law produced

52. See, e.g., Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST. 479 (1999).
53. Id. at 502.
54. Id. at 489.
55. A determinate sentence is one whose length is fxed by the sentencing body/judicial offcer at the time of
sentencing. Steven Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 53 EMORY L.J. 377, 382–85 (2005).
56. Petersilia, supra note 52, at 494–95 (noting that fourteen states had abolished parole by 1998).
57. Id. at 489.
58. Id. at 507–08.
59. See id. at 507–08.
60. Id. at 508.
61. Id. at 512–13.
62. Id. at 483 (explaining that parole revocation symbolizes the “lock ‘em up and throw away the key
attitudes”).
63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(a) (West 2016). Since 2012, the third strike must also be a “serious” or
“violent” felony. See J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, THE AMENDMENT OF THE THREE STRIKES
SENTENCING LAW 5 (2016), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Three-Strikes-Amendment-Couzens-Bigelow.
pdf.
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some very harsh sentences, including that in Ewing.64 California’s three-strikes
law was by no means unusual. As recounted by the majority in Ewing, “between
1993 and 1995, three-strikes laws effected a sea change in criminal sentencing
throughout the Nation,”65 refecting “a deliberate policy choice” that repeat
offenders “must be isolated from society in order to protect the public safety.”66
Like parole reduction, recidivist statutes were proposed in response to “outcry
against repeat offenders” and “disaffection with the rehabilitative model.”67
Statistical analyses suggest California’s Three Strikes law did not make the
public appreciably safer.68 One reason may be that a large majority of offenders to
whom the statute has been applied were incarcerated for non-violent crimes.69
Another explanation is that three-strikes sentencing provisions are often applied to
offenders who are nearing an age at which criminal behavior tends to drop off
precipitously.70 As a result, many such offenders are incarcerated just as incarceration begins to serve no public safety purpose.71 Recidivist statutes may also be
counterproductive insofar as incarceration increases the probability that an individual commits additional crimes after release.72 Incarceration can sever social
and familial connections, impede the pursuit of education, compromise job
prospects, and expose offenders to criminal networks. The experience of prison
appears to cause some prisoners to develop responses necessary for survival inside
prisons but that disserve them on the outside.73
Where the decline of probation and parole show the repudiation of rehabilitation
as an aim of punishment, recidivist sentencing enhancements more clearly show
the embrace of a strategy of identifying and incapacitating the dangerous.
D. Possession Offenses
Incapacitation is not limited to the back end of our criminal justice system.
Incapacitative justice also relies on law enforcement to predict dangerous conduct
64. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
65. Id. at 24 (citation omitted).
66. Id.
67. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Although the State alludes in passing to retribution or deterrence . . . its only serious justifcation for the 25-year minimum treats the sentence as a way to incapacitate a given
defendant from further crime . . . .”).
68. See ZIMRING, HAWKINS & KAMIN, supra note 37, at 85–105 (noting crime dropped signifcantly after 1994,
but there was no evidence that the three strikes law contributed by means of either incapacitation or deterrence);
EHLERS ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., STILL STRIKING OUT: TEN YEARS OF CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES, 12–19
(2004) infra note 122.
69. See EHLERS ET AL., supra note 68, at 8 (“[N]early two thirds . . . of second or third strikers were serving
time for a nonviolent offense.”).
70. Robinson, infra note 82, at 1451.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Jalila Jefferson-Bullock, The Time Is Ripe to Include Considerations of the Effects on Families
and Communities of Excessively Long Sentences, 83 UMKC L. REV. 73, 76 (2014).
73. See Martin H. Pritikin, Is Prison Increasing Crime?, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1049 (2008).
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and identify its perpetrators before it occurs. As detailed in a pivotal article by
Markus Dubber, crimes of drug and gun possession became enormously popular
tools for “identifcation and neutralization” of potential offenders during the war
on crime.74
The number and variety of possession offenses are striking. In 1998, there were
156 possession offenses proscribed in New York, including 115 felonies.75
Possession charges accounted for 18% of arrests throughout the state in 1998, and
one-third of those ultimately sentenced to jail or prisons.76 Possession can carry
harsh penalties—eleven in New York were punishable by terms of life.77 The
Supreme Court in Harmelin v. Michigan upheld the life sentence given to a
frst-time offender convicted of cocaine possession.78 Possession is frequently
charged along with other offenses in order “to increase the incapacitative potential
of a given conviction.”79
Since contraband rarely causes harm independent of any additional use, possession offenses are essentially inchoate, designed to identify persons likely to cause
harm and to enable police to interfere before harm occurs. Possession offenses
arguably stretch basic principles of criminal law in order to broaden the dragnet of
incapacitation and ease the path to prosecution.80 Thus, the law of possession
elevates “instrumentalities of crime” to crime itself81 in order to criminalize those
it suspects are likely to become criminals. It evades limits on attempt liability, by
requiring no “substantial step” towards causing harm.82 Possession crimes attenuate the requirement of culpability because knowledge of possession is often
presumed.83 Possession crimes attenuate the requirement of an act by ascribing
“constructive possession” to suspects in the vicinity of contraband.84
The Supreme Court has reshaped criminal procedure to facilitate the search for
contraband and the law of possession. Terry v. Ohio enabled offcers to stop,
question, and search suspects on the basis of reasonable suspicion of imminent
crime.85 The fact that reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk can be
74. Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 829, 856 (2001) (describing possession “as the most convenient gateway into the criminal justice
system”).
75. See id. at 859.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
79. Dubber, supra note 74, at 901.
80. See id. at 873 (“Given the fexibility of its conception and the convenience of its enforcement, possession
offenses alone can quickly and easily incapacitate large numbers of undesirables for long periods of time.”).
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2016) (proscribing the possession, brandishing, or discharging of frearms).
82. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 907–08; Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1448 n. 71 (2001).
83. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 864–65; State v. Adkins, 96 So. 3d 412, 415 (Fla. 2012).
84. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25(a) (McKinney 2016); United States v. Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 6–7 (1st Cir.
1994).
85. See Dubber, supra note 74, at 835.
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established by such diffuse indices of guilt as fight from police in a high crime
area86 shows that reasonable suspicion need not be of any particular crime. Once
stopped, a suspect can be asked to identify himself, enabling a check for
outstanding arrest warrants.87 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte held that one need not be
informed of one’s right to refuse a police search for contraband in the absence of
probable cause.88 These and many other holdings allow police to investigate
citizens who are not actively causing harm, for evidence of dangerous propensities. Even if a stop exposes neither contraband nor an outstanding warrant, it can
still lead to an arrest for disorderly conduct, obstruction of governmental administration, or even assault. In all these ways the search for contraband became central
to a strategy of identifying and arresting dangerous persons.
The fact that presence in a high crime area and fight from police can justify
stops as reasonable suggests that suspected dangerousness can serve as a proxy for
race. Studies have indeed shown that African Americans are more likely than
Whites to be stopped on foot89 and in cars,90 more likely to be searched if
stopped,91 and more likely to be arrested,92 particularly for drug offenses.93
E. Increasing Length of Prison Sentences
As currently practiced, penal incapacitation separates offenders from society
“for as long as possible.”94 Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984 to require longer, more determinate criminal sentencing and eliminate
parole for federal prisoners.95 The Act’s “truth in sentencing” component—
responding to frustration with judicial sentencing discretion—mandated that
federal prisoners serve at least 85% of their sentences.96 Ten years later, Congress
offered fnancial incentives for states to follow suit with their own truth in

86. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
87. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. of Nev., 542 U.S 177 (2004).
88. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1973).
89. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk”
Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007).
90. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RACIAL PROFILING: LIMITED DATA AVAILABLE ON MOTORIST STOPS 8–10
(2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/gg00041.pdf [http://perma.cc/CCK2-GKQH].
91. Traffc Stops, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?tytp&tid702 (last visited
Oct. 8, 2016).
92. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & LINH VUONG, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, CREATED EQUAL:
RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 10 (2009), http://www.nccdglobal.org/sites/
default/fles/publication_pdf/created-equal.pdf.
93. Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 261,
269–74 (2009); Katherine Beckett et al., Race, Drugs, and Policing: Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery
Arrests, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 105, 106 (2006).
94. Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the “War on Prisoners,” 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 187 (2010).
95. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codifed as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2016).
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sentencing statutes, which most did.97 Meanwhile, states developed a variety of
sentence-enhancing statutes, including not only three-strikes statutes, but also
mandatory minimums, stricter drug penalties, and the expanded use of life without
parole sentences. To what end? Studies have found no clear incapacitative effect of
these longer sentences on public safety,98 while minority offenders, particularly
African Americans, have borne the brunt of longer sentences.99
In state systems, time served increased substantially across all crime categories
between 1990 and 2009—37% for violent crimes, 36% for drug crimes, and 24%
for property crimes—although sentence length varied substantially across states.100
These increases were the result of sentence enhancement legislation as well as
decreasing use of probation and parole.101 Federal sentencing exhibited a similar
overall trend: average time served more than doubled between 1988 and 2012, and
increased across all categories of crime.102 The increase was caused in large part
by mandatory minimum sentencing, the federal “truth in sentencing” policy,103
and the number of inmates serving life without parole—which grew from 12,453
in 1992 to 41,000 in 2008.104
This unprecedented lengthening of prison sentences cannot be justifed by
penological purposes other than incapacitation.105 Although incarceration undoubtedly has a deterrent effect,106 there is little evidence that lengthening prison

97. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); see
ELSA CHEN, IMPACTS OF THREE STRIKES AND TRUTH IN SENTENCING ON THE VOLUME AND COMPOSITION OF
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 19 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffles1/nij/grants/187109.pdf; William Pizzi,
Understanding the United States’ Incarceration Rate, 95 JUDICATURE 207, 207–08 (2012) (discussing New York’s
“Jenna’s Law”).
98. See CHEN, supra note 97, at 34; Richard L. Lippke, Crime Reduction and the Length of Prison Sentences,
24 L. & POL’Y 17, 22 (2002); Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 82.
99. Joshua B. Fischman and Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 729 (2012).
100. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org//media/legacy/uploadedfles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and_corrections/
prisontimeservedpdf.pdf.
101. Id. at 7. Although much of the increase in time served was achieved through determinate sentencing
reforms rather than longer maximums, that does not mean that sentence length was not an independently
important goal of sentencing reform. Care could have been taken to lower maxima while pushing minima up, so
as to make determinacy neutral as to time served. But as Wilson observed, there was a clear perception that the
public wanted more punishment. See FOWLE, supra note 38.
102. See PEW CHARITABLE TRUST., PRISON TIME SURGES FOR FEDERAL INMATES 2 (2015), http://www.pewtrusts.
org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/11/prison-time-surges-for-federal-inmates.
103. See id. at 4.
104. Sharon Dolovich, Exclusion and Control in the Carceral State, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 259, 308 (2011).
105. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 82 (“It is fair to say that none of these policies were grounded in
research-based evidence that connected their enactment to reducing crime or producing any positive criminal
justice outcome.”).
106. RANDOLPH ROTH, AMERICAN HOMICIDE 9 (2009) (explaining collapse of law enforcement causes homicide
rates to skyrocket).
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sentences increases this deterrent effect.107 Some studies even report that longer
sentences may actually exacerbate recidivism.108
Nor do rehabilitation or retribution provide a satisfactory explanation for
increasingly punitive sentencing. As to the former, most prison systems are bereft
of educational and workplace training.109 Life sentences serve no rehabilitative
purpose,110 and it was the rejection of rehabilitation that led policymakers to
embrace incapacitation.111 If anything, data suggests that longer sentences stimulate antisocial tendencies by disconnecting prisoners from their families, stirring
individual and community-wide resentment, exposing non-violent offenders to the
criminogenic infuence of more hardened offenders, and over-crowding prisons to
a degree that increases aggression.112
As for the goal of retribution, sentence-enhancing practices generate outcomes
that seem out of line with just deserts.113 The Supreme Court’s docket in recent
years offers striking examples: ffty years to life for stealing videotapes worth
$200;114 forty years for possessing nine ounces of marijuana;115 life imprisonment
for obtaining $121 by false pretenses;116 and life, without parole, for possession of

107. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null
Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 143 (2003); VALERIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: EVALUATING CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT 5 (2010), http://www.sentencingproject.
org/doc/Deterrence%20Briefng%20.pdf (citing David Farrington, Paul Langan & Per-Olof H. Wikstrom,
Changes in Crime and Punishment in America, England and Sweden between the 1980s and 1990s, 3 STUD. IN
CRIME PREVENTION, 104 (1994)).
108. See WRIGHT, supra note 107, at 6; Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 76.
109. See, e.g., Gregory A. Knott, Cost and Punishment: Reassessing Incarceration Costs and the Value of
College-in-Prison Programs, 32 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 267, 281–82 (2012) (discussing the defunding of prison
education in the 1990s); Editorial, A College Education for Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.
nytimes.com/2016/02/16/opinion/a-college-education-for-prisoners.html?_r1.
110. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012) (“Life without parole ‘forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.’”).
111. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1990); ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15.
112. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 87–89 (“Paradoxically, longer federal sentences have also
resulted in a staggering increase in recidivism.”).
113. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 83 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that if a sentence of ffty
years-to-life for stealing videotapes worth $200 “is not grossly disproportionate, the principle has no meaning”);
Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 75 (calling for legislation to “transform our federal sentencing scheme from
one of stringent, excessive incapacitation to one that punishes the morally blameworthy”). The pursuit of
retribution requires that “[f]irst, the primary object of criminal sanctions is to punish culpable behavior” and
“[s]econd, the severity of the sanctions visited on the offender should be proportioned to the degree of his
culpability.” ALLEN, supra note 28, at 66. Similarly, “[t]he penalty is . . . not just a means of crime prevention but
a merited response to the actor’s deed, ‘rectifying the balance’ . . . and expressing moral reprobation of the actor
for the wrong.” ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 51 (1976). As a principle of proportionality, retribution
requires that “one should not be punished more harshly than one deserves.” Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional
Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (2005).
114. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66–77.
115. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
116. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
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cocaine.117 The Court did not even discuss desert when it upheld Ewing’s sentence
of twenty-fve years-to-life for shop-lifting.118 Public opinion no longer accepts
enhanced sentencing as just.119
Finally, sentence-enhancing legislation exacerbates racial disparities in prison
populations. Patterns in discretionary exceptions to mandatory minimum penalties
reveal a racial bias on the part of courts.120 Offenders can avoid being subject to
federal mandatory minimums by way of a legislative “safety valve” that judges
may choose to apply when sentencing nonviolent, frst-time drug offenders. Data
reveals that a disproportionately low percentage of eligible African American
offenders receive the beneft of this safety-valve provision.121 In California, a 2004
report showed African American offenders comprised a higher percentage of
second and third strikers than of prisoners generally, perhaps refecting the
predictably cumulative effect of higher arrest and conviction rates in a recidivist
sentencing regime.122
In sum, the incapacitation strategies we have surveyed—the reduction of
probation and parole, the imposition of recidivist sentences, the policing of
possession, and the lengthening of sentences—have combined to incarcerate more
people for longer, on the basis of their perceived danger.
II. INCAPACITATION AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT SENTENCING PROPORTIONALITY
Part I reviewed the political origins of incapacitative strategies and their
prevalence in modern crime control. This Part reviews the role of incapacitation as
a justifcation for punishment within Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence. It then critically examines incapacitation theoretically, as a utilitarian
justifcation for punishment. Finally, it critically examines incapacitation empirically, as a practice of selecting individuals for punishment on the basis of
predictions of dangerousness.
A. Incapacitation in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence embodies a contradiction, expressed in the
language of the Amendment itself, prohibiting punishment that is both “cruel and

117. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
118. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); see Lee, supra note 113, at 679–84 (criticizing the plurality
opinion for failing to take retribution into account as a side constraint in proportionality analysis).
119. See Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 80 (noting a recent shift in public opinion away from longer,
incapacitative sentences).
120. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report to Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal
Criminal Justice System, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 185, 188–89 (2012) (explaining that Black offenders receive relief
from mandatory minimums at signifcantly lower rate than do offenders of other races).
121. See id. at 188.
122. See EHLERS ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., RACIAL DIVIDE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S
THREE STRIKES LAW ON AFRICAN AMERICANS 3 fg.1 (2004).
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unusual.”123 A prohibition on cruel punishment sounds like a substantive right to
decent treatment, restricting the injuries government can infict. By contrast, a
prohibition on “unusual” punishment sounds like a procedural restriction, a
requirement that injuries be inficted systematically, according to rules. Because
the prohibition is conjunctive, it seems that a “cruel” punishment can become more
acceptable by being imposed more “usually.” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on
proportionality bears out the paradox implicit in this phrasing. Disproportionate
punishment violates not “decency” as such, but “the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”124 The Court has taken the
punishments recently assigned by legislatures and imposed by courts as evidence
of these evolving standards.125 Thus, proportionality review has two aspects,
described in Graham v. Florida, which we may call comparative proportionality
and instrumental proportionality.126 Comparative proportionality measures the
consistency of a sentence with sentences imposed by other jurisdictions, while
instrumental proportionality measures the consistency of a sentence with the
justifying purposes of punishment.127
Chief Justice Warren apparently anticipated that application of “evolving
standards of decency” would make prevailing punishments—and therefore constitutionally permissible punishments—progressively more lenient.128 Instead, in the
face of rising crime rates, the Court’s efforts to constitutionalize criminal justice
provoked political resistance.129 Candidates campaigned for stiffer sentences and
less judicial discretion.130 As incarceration rates rose, sentences lengthened, and
legislatures embraced incapacitation, these evolving standards of severity had a
self-legitimizing effect. The comparative prong of proportionality analysis impeded the Eighth Amendment from checking a national movement to impose harsh
punishments routinely.131
Nevertheless, even when punishments are rising generally, there will be outlier
cases—like that of Ewing—that provoke consideration of instrumental proportionality. In considering the instrumental proportionality of capital punishment, the
Court has recognized only retribution and deterrence as relevant penal purposes
(on the assumption that imprisonment is adequate to incapacitate, and that

123. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
124. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
125. See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 813–14 (1982); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420
(2008); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
126. GUYORA BINDER, FELONY MURDER 34–35 (2012). Youngjae Lee makes a similar distinction between
comparative and noncomparative desert. See Lee, supra note 113, at 685.
127. BINDER, supra note 126, at 34–35.
128. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
129. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 93; STUNTZ, supra note 33, at 217.
130. See SIMON, supra note 33, at 113–32 (discussing the backlash against the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure and death penalty decisions provoking attacks on the judiciary in political campaigns).
131. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 24–25, 29–30 (2003); supra note 113 and text accompanying note 1
for defnitions of these concepts. The Court, however, does not defne these terms.
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execution cannot serve rehabilitation).132 Because offenders without culpability
are both less blameworthy and less deterrable, the Court has often reasoned that the
proportionality of capital punishment must depend on the culpability of the
crime.133 In Ewing, however, the Court ignored culpability, and reasoned that
sentences of incarceration need not serve the penal purposes of retribution or
deterrence.134 Instead, the Court held that punishment is proportional if there is a
“reasonable basis for believing” that it advances any of the traditional justifcations
for punishment—retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, or incapacitation.135
Because the Ewing Court saw advancement of any purpose of punishment as
suffcient to justify a term of years as proportionate, it concluded that the goal of
incapacitating repeat offenders could justify an indeterminate life sentence for an
ex-offender caught stealing. Because the sentence did not need to advance desert
or deterrence, it did not matter that it was clearly out of line with the offender’s
culpability: “To be sure, Ewing’s sentence is a long one. But it refects a rational
legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that offenders who have committed
serious or violent felonies and who continue to commit felonies must be
incapacitated.”136
Thus, Ewing seemed to leave very little space for judicial proportionality in
reviewing noncapital sentences. In most jurisdictions a felony is simply an offense
punishable by a year or more. If incapacitation of past offenders suffces to justify
a life-maximum term as proportionate for any felony, legislatures are free to
choose any sentence between a year and life for any reason or no reason. Yet, as a
theoretical purpose for imprisonment, incapacitation means more than simply
preventing an offender from committing certain future crimes; it requires that
punishment improve public safety, and indeed public welfare, by achieving a net
decrease in violent crime at an acceptable cost.
Less than a decade after Ewing, Graham v. Florida prohibited life without
parole for all juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses.137 The Graham Court
articulated a new “categorical” standard of proportionality applicable to review of
entire sentencing practices, as opposed to individual sentences.138 The analysis
consists of two prongs we have described: determining whether a sentencing
practice is contrary to national consensus, and, if so, assessing the penalty in light
of the defendant’s culpability and the other purposes of punishment.139

132. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183–84 (1976).
133. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568, 571 (2005);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982).
134. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 30.
137. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010).
138. Id. at 62. Categorical challenges implicate a “particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of
offenders who have committed a range of crimes.” Id.
139. Id. at 61–62.
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When assessing whether sentencing juveniles to life without parole for nonhomicide crimes served any legitimate purpose, the Court was moved by empirical
evidence distinguishing juvenile and adult minds.140 Whether this preference for
empirical evidence will become a lasting feature of proportionality jurisprudence
is one of Graham’s many unanswered questions.141 What does seem clear is that
Graham restored retribution as a limitation on noncapital sentencing; a sentencing
practice that improves public safety may nonetheless be struck down as excessive
in relation to that deserved for the offense or necessary to deter it.142 “Incapacitation,” Justice Kennedy explained, “cannot override all other considerations, lest
the Eighth Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”143
More recently, Miller v. Alabama held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles, even for homicide.144
Miller combined Graham’s “categorical” analysis with an individualized assessment of culpability that would account for a defendant’s age and “environmental
vulnerabilities.”145 Emphasizing that “[a]n ever-growing body of research in
developmental psychology and neuroscience” supported the distinction between
juvenile and adult offenders, the Court again refused to credit the assumption that
certain offenders are irretrievably depraved by virtue of the type of crime they
committed.146 Applying the framework of Graham and Miller to recidivist statutes
requires more rigorous examination of incapacitation’s theoretical and empirical
assumptions.
B. Incapacitation as a Penological Theory
To incapacitate is to render incapable of committing crimes. Penal incapacitation assumes that certain past offenders are inherently dangerous and should
therefore be confned in state custody, where they can be monitored and controlled.
An incapacitative justifcation for incarcerating an offender presupposes that
offender’s propensity to commit crimes. Incarceration imposes a large social cost:
it deprives the offender of liberty, deprives society of the beneft of any prosocial
conduct the offender would otherwise perform, and involves cost of confning and
maintaining the offender. To justify penal incapacitation, the offender’s expected
crimes must be suffciently harmful, and their probability suffciently high, to
outweigh this expected cost. In addition, there must be no less costly means of
preventing these offenses. The only expected crimes suffciently harmful to justify

140. Id. at 68.
141. See Michael H. O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV.
1087, 1113 (2013)
142. Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment Test, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 59–60 (2010).
143. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010).
144. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2464 & n.5, 2465.
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the social cost of preventive confnement are violent crimes.147
As explained by Wilson, penal incapacitation requires three assumptions. First,
past offenders, or some identifable subgroup of past offenders, must be more
likely than others to commit crimes in the future.148 Second, offenders removed
from society will not be replaced by other potential offenders.149 Third, incarceration will not make offenders substantially more likely to commit crimes upon
release than they would have been if left at large during that time.150
Incapacitation also requires two additional assumptions that Wilson left unmentioned. Thus, a fourth necessary assumption is that incarcerated offenders will not
offend or suffer offenses at the same or greater rates while incarcerated.151 To the
extent that crimes are committed in prison, incarceration merely shifts the risk of
crime to a different segment of the population rather than reducing its overall
occurrence.152 A ffth necessary assumption is that there is no less costly alternative means of achieving the same crime reduction. This ffth assumption can be
seen as a corollary of the frst, however. If crime is caused by inherent character
traits, environmental interventions are unlikely to be effective. Conversely, if
crime is caused by environmental circumstances, incapacitating individuals will
likely be less effective than altering the environment.
Each of these assumptions is problematic.153 Consider the assumption that
incarcerated offenders will not be “replaced” by other individuals. Even Wilson
conceded that such replacement is likely insofar as crimes are committed by
organizations operating in illicit markets.154 These crimes occur regardless of
whether one individual is incarcerated.155 Moreover, in a market catering to
addictive preferences, in which demand may not decline with higher prices,
competing organizations may absorb the “displaced” transactions previously
belonging to other organizations.156 While Wilson treated such offending as
marginal, drug crimes currently constitute about one-third of annual admissions to

147. Rummel v. Estelle, 455 U.S. 263, 284 (1980) (upholding a Texas recidivist statute).
148. WILSON, supra note 40, at 146; see Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions
of Recidivism, 96 HARV. L. REV. 511, 514–15 (1982).
149. WILSON, supra note 40, at 146.
150. Id.; Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy, 3 U. ST. THOMAS
L. J. 536, 543 (2006).
151. See id. at 556.
152. See infra Part IV.
153. Paul Robinson points to a further drawback of incapacitation—that by breaking the link between
punishment and desert, incapacitation may erode the legitimacy of criminal prohibitions and thereby weaken their
deterrent effect. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1432.
154. WILSON, supra note 40, at 145; see also Todd. R. Clear, The Impact of Incarceration on Public Safety, 74
SOC. RES. 613, 617 (2007) (explaining that “many of the crimes a person behind bars might have been involved in
were he free occur anyway”).
155. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 145.
156. See Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43, 57 (1996).
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prison.157 Crimes against property and persons motivated by drug purchase may
also be subject to a replacement effect. But more signifcantly, the assumption that
only black-market transactions are subject to replacement effects is baseless.
Recall that predatory crimes like burglary and robbery are often committed by
groups, because there is strength in numbers, and because peer pressure can
overcome moral inhibition and fear.158 Yet the feasibility and probability of a
group offense are not necessarily affected by the removal of one member,159 who
may be replaced in any case. While the political rhetoric of the war on crime may
promote images of sadistically motivated offenders,160 most crime is committed to
obtain social or economic resources not available through more conventional
channels.161
Next, the assumption that incarceration will have no effect on the post-release
rate of offending appears false.162 Indeed, some studies have found a net increase
in crime as a consequence of high incarceration rates.163 Physical and psychological trauma,164 recruitment into criminal networks, overcrowding, and severance of
family and community ties are a few aspects of prison that demonstrably aggravate
recidivism.165 The prison environment resembles a theater of war in its constant
threat of unforeseeable violence. Adding to these effects that push ex-prisoners
toward violence, there are also economic incentives that pull them toward crime.
While a criminal record in itself will reduce the job prospects of offenders, a record
of incarceration adds to these barriers, because we have a strong cognitive bias
towards attributing misfortune to character. Thus, the infiction of a more severe
punishment is likely to infuence potential employers to see the offender as more
culpable and incorrigible. Unfortunately, fear of ex-convicts can make their
recidivism a self-fulflling prophecy.
157. Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American Prisons: The Critical Distinction Between Stock and
Flow, BROOKINGS SOC. MOBILITY MEMOS (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/social-mobility-memos/
posts/2015/11/25-drug-offenders-stock-fow-prisons-rothwell.
158. Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 48, at 273–75; Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J.
1307, 1316–20 (2003).
159. Clear, supra note 154, at 617.
160. See Esther I. Madriz, Images of Criminals and Victims: A Study on Women’s Fear and Social Control, 11
GENDER & SOC’Y 342, 346 (1997); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Evil and the Law of Murder, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437,
466 (1990).
161. See, e.g., Douglas L. Yearwood & Gerry Koinis, Revisiting Property Crime and Economic Conditions: An
Exploratory Study to Identify Predictive Indicators Beyond Unemployment Rates, 48 SOC. SCI. J. 145, 154 (2011)
(discussing causal relationship between labor market conditions and property crime).
162. Jefferson-Bullock, supra note 72, at 88 (quoting United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345
(E.D.N.Y. 2000)) (“The [prison] atmosphere makes debilitation much more likely than rehabilitation. Whether by
introducing petty criminals to more violent offenders, forcing prisoners into racist gangs, or subjecting them to
violence and rape, too often the prison system serves merely to exacerbate the criminal tendencies of its
inhabitants.”).
163. See infra Part III.
164. Craig Haney, Psychology and the Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth
Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 499, 538–39 (1997) (discussing prison-induced PTSD).
165. See e.g., Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1051–54.
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Nor can we assume that relocating offenders to prison will prevent them from
committing crimes, or being victimized. By almost all accounts, prisons are brutal,
violent places.166 Prisoners lack the opportunity to fee from threats and their
complaints may be greeted with offcial indifference and retaliation from those
they accuse. As many as one-in-fve male inmates reportedly experience sexual
assault while incarcerated,167 and a recent report estimated that physical assaults
are eighteen times more common behind prison walls for men and twenty-seven
times more common for women.168 Prison staff also face assaults from inmates.169
To these crimes by inmates, we must add crimes predictably committed against
inmates by correctional staff, who are obliged to coerce and control an antagonistic
population, while facing little risk of sanctions for abusing their authority.170
Finally, let us turn to the foundational premise that past offenders are more
likely than the rest of the general population to offend in the future as a result of
intrinsic personality traits.171 As we have noted, the less confdent we are that
crime inheres in character, the more hopeful we can be that crime can be reduced
by improving social conditions rather than disabling individuals. Because of the
enormous social cost of mass incarceration, incapacitation’s fundamental premise
of inherent dangerousness should not simply be assumed. We should require
evidence. The next Section considers the kinds of evidence that can support
predictions of dangerousness.
C. Selective Incapacitation and Predictions of Dangerousness
Selective incapacitation requires predictions as to which offenders are most
likely to recidivate. Can such predictions be made with suffcient confdence to
justify the high social cost of incarceration beyond that required for such other
goals as deterrence and retribution? Researchers have evaluated two methods of
prediction: clinical assessment and actuarial assessment. Actuarial assessment has
played a particularly important role in guiding sentencing decisions, prisoner
classifcation, and parole decisions.172

166. See infra Section IV.A.
167. STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION FACILITIES 5 (2006),
http://justdetention.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/In-The-Shadows-Sexual-Violence-in-U.S.-DetentionFacilities.pdf. According to this report, the “the rates of sexual abuse at women’s prisons vary widely, [but] at the
worst facilities[,] as many as one in four prisoners is victimized.” Id. at 5.
168. Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV.
588, 595 (2007).
169. See Karen F. Lahm, Inmate Assaults on Prison Staff: A Multilevel Examination of an Overlooked Form of
Prison Violence, 89 PRISON J. 131 (2009).
170. STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 167, at 13–14 (stating that a signifcant percentage of sexual assaults
against inmates are committed by correctional staff).
171. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 181.
172. Melissa Hamilton, Adventures in Risk: Predicting Violent and Sexual Recidivism in Sentencing Law, 47
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2015).
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1. Clinical Predictions
Clinical assessment can be based on observation, interviews, administration of
psychological tests, and review of case histories. Such assessments have had a
poor track record of predictive accuracy. During the last quarter of the twentieth
century, a consensus developed among psychologists and psychiatrists that predictions could not be reliably based on clinical assessments. One analysis of ten
studies found only a 0.10 correlation between predicted and actual reoffending by
sex offenders.173 “Guided” clinical assessments, which consider factors linked
empirically to violence are more effective, achieving a correlation of 0.23.174
Nevertheless, psychologists have had some success in predicting violent recidivism on the basis of a clinical diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder
(“ASPD”).175 Under the criteria set out in the most recent Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”), ASPD consists of impairments
in “personality function” (undeveloped sense of self) and “interpersonal functioning” (lack of empathy and intimacy), as well as elevated manipulativeness,
deceitfulness, callousness, hostility, impulsivity, risk taking, and irresponsibility.176 A diagnosis of ASPD requires that these impairments are “stable across time
and consistent across situations.”177 Thus, such a diagnosis cannot be made on the
basis of one interview, but requires sustained observation over a long period of
time. A recent survey of relevant studies found that 14% of individuals diagnosed
with ASPD commit acts of violence, compared with a rate of 1–2% in the general
population.178
While psychopathy is not a formal diagnosis included in the DSM-5, many
clinicians and researchers recognize it as a sub-group of ASPD with greater

173. R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
50, 54 (1998); Tamara Rice Lave, Controlling Sexually Violent Predators: Continued Incarceration at What
Cost?, 14 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 213, 231 (2011). To illustrate the ineffcacy for sentencing of a predictor achieving a
correlation coeffcient of 0.1, Hanson provides a numerical example in which 20% of a population will reoffend
and the predictor correctly predicts reoffending only 25% of the time. Hanson, supra note 173, at 53–54.
174. Hanson, supra note 173, at 54–55.
175. See, e.g., Richard Rogers et al., Diagnostic Validity of Antisocial Personality Disorder: A Prototypical
Analysis, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 677 (1992); Glenn D. Walters, Psychopathy and Crime: Testing the Incremental
Validity of PCL-R-Measured Psychopathy as a Predictor of General and Violent Recidivism, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
404 (2012).
176. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS 44 (Thomas A. Widiger ed., 2012).
177. See Jerome C. Wakefeld, DSM-5 and the General Defnition of Personality Disorder, 41 CLINICAL SOC.
WORK J. 168, 176 (2013); see also Jasmin Wertz et al., Etiology of Pervasive Versus Situational Antisocial
Behaviors: A Multi-Informant Longitudinal Cohort Study, 87 CHILD DEV. 312, 312 (2016) (stating that
cross-situational antisocial behavior in children signals more “severe” pathology and helps predict likelihood of
persistent adult offending).
178. Rongqin Yu et al., Personality Disorders, Violence, and Antisocial Behavior: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Regression Analysis, 26 J. PERSONALITY DISORDERS 775, 779–80 (2012). It is widely believed that ASPD is
more prevalent in prison than in the general population. See Andrea L. Glenn et al., Antisocial Personality
Disorder: A Current Review, 15 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 427, 427 (2013) (reporting ASPD present in 47% of
male prisoners compared with approximately 3% of general male population).
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potential for planned, instrumental aggression.179 However, psychopathy is often
identifed in a single lengthy semi-structured interview, developed by Robert Hare,
called a Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (“PCL-R”).180 Hare estimated that
psychopaths, although comprising only 1% of the population, are responsible for
one-third of all violent crime,181 and other researchers found that high scores on
this test predicted very high rates of violent recidivism (77%) among offenders
released from a maximum security psychiatric hospital.182 Yet the latter study was
based on a very high-risk population with a base violent recidivism rate of 40%.183
Hare developed a simplifed actuarial instrument for quickly assessing psychopathic traits, referred to as the Psychopathy Checklist—Screening Version, fnding
that future violent offenders were 70% more likely to score high on this test. This
predictive power is similar to that of actuarial instruments based on static factors
(past events not subject to intervention). As we shall see, however, this level of
predictive accuracy is not adequate for predicting dangerousness within a population with very low base rates of offending.
Even using clinical diagnoses of ASPD would require incapacitating seven
individuals in order to prevent violence by a single offender.184 Nevertheless, a
diagnosis of ASPD in combination with other predictive factors might predict
violent reoffending with greater reliability. In addition, there is some prospect for
improving the effcacy of diagnoses of ASPD and clinical identifcations of
psychopathy, as recent research has indicated that mechanical reading of MRI’s
can now predict high psychopathy scores with 70% accuracy.185 Such mechanical
diagnosis might lower costs and increase the availability of clinical prediction, but
at present would lower its accuracy. On the other hand, conceivably at some point
in the future, neuroimaging—or neuroimaging in combination with other tech-

179. See Glenn et al., supra note 178, at 428 (“Psychopathy, while not recognized in the diagnostic criteria of
DSM 5, describes individuals with many of the features of ASPD, but who, in addition, demonstrate a
characteristic set of interpersonal and affective features, including superfcial charm, manipulative-ness, callousness, and shallow affect . . . .”); Thomas Nadelhoffer et al., Neuroprediction, Violence, and the Law: Setting the
Stage, 5 NEUROETHICS 67, 80 (2012).
180. Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 179, at 80; R.D. HARE ET AL., THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST—REVISED
PCL-R (1991).
181. Robert D. Hare & Leslie M. McPherson, Violent and Aggressive Behavior by Criminal Psychopaths, 7
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 35 (1984).
182. Grant Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 625, 632 (1991).
183. The violent recidivism rate for non-psychopaths was 21%. Id.
184. Yu et al., supra note 178, at 779–80. Note, however, that roughly two-thirds of those offenders with ASPD
will commit several offenses. Id. at 784–85.
185. See Vaughn R. Steele et al., Machine Learning of Structural Magnetic Resonance Imaging Predicts
Psychopathic Traits in Adolescent Offenders 1 (Dec. 9, 2015) (unpublished article), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2015.12.013; B.C. Fink et al., Assessment of Psychopathic Traits in a Youth Forensic Sample: A
Methodological Comparison, 40 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 971 (2012). On issues raised by neuroprediction
generally, see Nadelhoffer et al., supra note 179, at 86. A useful survey of research on neuroimaging and
prediction of violence is Yaling Yang & Adrian Raine, Prefrontal Structural and Functional Brain Imaging
Findings in Antisocial, Violent, and Psychopathic Individuals: A Meta-Analysis, 174 PSYCHIATRY RES. 81 (2009).
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niques—could improve prediction. Neuroimaging also has the potential to help
identify therapeutic interventions that could obviate confnement for offenders
presenting ASPD or psychopathy.186
2. Actuarial Predictions
Actuarial instruments use recidivism rates in a sample population of past
offenders to identify correlations between reoffending and offender characteristics,
such as being male or having a prior criminal record. Each characteristic is then
assigned a “weight” or score based on the strength of its correlation with
recidivism, and these weights are aggregated to predict the likelihood that a
particular individual will reoffend. Because false positives result in needless
incarceration, we should be sure that risk assessment tools are methodologically
sound and reasonably accurate.187
There is no clear consensus on the accuracy of actuarial predictions or even on
how to evaluate the accuracy of these predictions.188 Actuarial instruments
nevertheless play an infuential role in determining sentencing length, prisoner
classifcation, parole decisions, and post-release civil commitment.189 Two aspects
of actuarial tools are particularly problematic. First, actuarial tools over-predict
dangerousness, as a large majority of offenders classifed as dangerous never
commit violent crimes.190 Second, some factors used to predict dangerousness,
such as credit scores or past unemployment, relate to the offender’s socioeconomic
status rather than his disposition.191 By relying on these actuarial predictions,
states may incarcerate offenders no more dangerous than their more fortunate
fellow citizens, while leaving social and economic factors that encourage violence
to continue unabated.
Actuarial instruments inevitably produce many times more false positives than
true positives when used to predict violent offenses or sexual offenses.192 The
reason for this is that base rates for such offenses are generally low across the
population. As a result, even if past violent offenders and sexual offenders are
signifcantly more likely than the rest of the population to commit such offenses,
their rates of violent reoffending are far lower than the popular image of
intractably dangerous offenders would suggest. For example, a U.S. Department of
Justice study of almost 10,000 sex offenders (almost all convicted of rape, sexual
assault, or child molestation) found that only 5.3% were arrested for a new sex
186. Nadelhoffer, supra note 179, at 81–82.
187. See Melissa Hamilton, Public Safety, Individual Liberty, and Suspect Science: Future Dangerousness
Assessments and Sex Offender Laws, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 712–13 (2011).
188. Id. at 726. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1450 (“A scientist’s ability to predict future criminality using
all available data is poor[.]”).
189. See Lave, supra note 173, at 213–18.
190. Id. at 237.
191. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1439–40.
192. See Lave, supra note 173, at 238–39.
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crime within the frst three years after release.193 Only 3.3% of convicted child
molesters were rearrested for a sex crime against a child during that period.194 In
the face of such low base rates, any tool predicting recidivism is likely to be far less
accurate than the assumption that any given past offender will not recidivate. In the
case of child molesters, this optimistic assumption will be accurate 97% of the
time; in the case of sexual offenders, it will be accurate 95% of the time.195 Tamara
Lave’s analysis of Static-99, a widely used actuarial tool with a reported accuracy
rate of 70% in predicting sexual offending, found that every accurate prediction of
this type of recidivism would be accompanied by a minimum of 5.6 incorrect
positive predictions.196 Thus, actuarial tools exaggerate the likelihood that any
particular offender poses a danger to the public.197
Application of a predictive instrument depends on similarity between the
sample population on which it was based and the population to which it is being
applied.198 Yet Static-99 is based on data from British and Canadian psychiatric
institutions and maximum security prisons.199 Both population groups present risk
factors not present to the same extent in the general population of American
offenders. Psychiatric inmates typically present psychoses and have been found
dangerous or self-destructive by a court, while maximum security prisoners have
typically committed violent crimes and have been deemed dangerous by a

193. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994 1 (2003).
194. Id. at 24.
195. Lave, supra note 173, at 242.
196. Id. at 238–40, 270–71. To understand why this ratio of 5.6 false positives for every true positive is a
minimum, and that a predictive method that is 70% accurate almost certainly performs much worse than this in
identifying the 5.3% of sex reoffenders who will reoffend, consider three examples:
(1) Assume that for every 1000 sex offenders, 53 will recidivate. A predictor that is 70% accurate
in predicting both offending and non-offending will correctly identify (and incapacitate) 37 of 53
future offenders (37 true positives, 16 false negatives), but will incorrectly identify and wrongly
incarcerate 284 suspects (284 false positives, 663 true negatives). Thus false positives/true
positives  284/37  7.7.
(2) A predictor that is accurate 70% of the time that minimizes false positives will maximize false
negatives. It also, unfortunately, would have to minimize true positives, while maximizing true
negatives. Thus it will correctly predict and prevent 0 offenses (0 true positives, 53 false negatives)
and will misidentify and wrongly incarcerate 247 suspects (247 false positives, 700 true
negatives). Assuming no true positives, false positives/true positives  247/0  infnity.
(3) A predictor that somehow miraculously identifes every future offender (53 true positives, 0
false negatives) would also misidentify and wrongly incarcerate 300 suspects (300 false positives,
647 true negatives). Thus false positives/true positives  300/53  5.6. This is the very best that a
70% accurate predictor could do. Yet surely it is unlikely that all of the 300 mistakes it would make
would be false positives and 0 would be false negatives.
In sum, a 70% accurate predictive instrument would wrongly incarcerate somewhere between 5.6 and infnity
suspects for every offense prevented.
197. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1450–54.
198. See Hamilton, supra note 172, at 36–37.
199. Id.
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sentencing judge. Predictions made using this data will likely exaggerate the
probability that offenders will recidivate.200
In fact, over-prediction may result even from sentencing offenders on the basis
of predictive instruments developed using a population of offenders. Here the
problem is that the mean rate of reoffending for the population of prisoners may
greatly exceed the rate of reoffending for most offenders because of the presence in
the population of a small group in which the rate of reoffending is very high.201
The reasons for this may be (1) dispositional factors not captured by actuarial
instruments, such as Antisocial Personality Disorder; (2) situational factors, such
as social relationships with gang members; or (3) biographical factors, such as
early abuse or lead exposure. Such hidden factors may raise the reoffending rate of
the prison population as a whole, leading courts to overestimate the probability
that most offenders will reoffend.
Another way that actuarial predictions may over-predict dangerousness is by
placing undue weight on nonviolent offenses. Many actuarial tools predict whether
or not an offender will commit any type of future crime.202 If only violent crime
imposes enough cost on society to warrant incapacitative incarceration,203 grouping all predicted crime together results in excessive incapacitation.
Assuming that actuarial tools were able to accurately predict future offending,
these predictions would not necessarily show that offenders possess an inherent
criminal predisposition. Instead, predictive factors may refect situational determinates of behavior that are beyond an offender’s control.204 For instance, the most
widely used instrument for predicting general recidivism, the Level of Service
Inventory—Revised, evaluates criminal history, education and employment, fnancial resources, family and marital status, housing accommodations, leisure and
recreation activities, companions and social infuences, alcohol and drug problems, emotional and personal diffculties, and attitudes regarding crime and
authority.205 A prediction of “high-risk” generated by the situational factors on this
list indicts not the individual offender but the social circumstances of the

200. Id.
201. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G. REP.
237, 240 (2015).
202. See Hamilton, supra note 172, at 19–20 (“Many instruments count any illegal act . . . [and] operationalize
recidivism as a simple dichotomous measure.”).
203. See Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation: More at Stake than Controlling Violent Crime,
62 UMKC L. REV. 107, 122–23 (1993) (citation omitted) (“Selective incapacitation is ‘the idea that an effective
way to sanction offenders is to reserve scarce prison and jail space for those who are predictably the most
dangerous and criminally active.’”).
204. Haney, supra note 164, at 527–28 (“Remarkably, the diagnostic equations used to identify candidates for
selective incapacitation actually transformed situational and structural variables such as unemployment into
dispositional traits and used them as indices of future dangerousness.”).
205. See Amanda L. Gentry et al., Comparing Sex Offender Risk Classifcation Using the Static-99 and LSI-R
Assessment Instruments, 15 RES. ON SOC. WORK PRAC. 557, 559 (2005).
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offender’s background.206 Actuarial predictions ascribe risk more often to individuals from marginalized communities, which are saturated with crime, poverty,
inadequate schools, fewer employment opportunities, elevated incidence of child
abuse and neglect, drug use and distribution, and other consequences of socioeconomic blight.207 Even criminal history, while specifc to an individual offender,
incorporates crime-inducing situational forces imposed by violent, overcrowded
prisons and by the many barriers to reentry that follow criminal conviction.
Law enforcement agencies also use socioeconomic factors to target potential
offenders.208 Although political and legal constraints do not allow police to overtly
target the unemployed, uneducated, indigent, or members of racial or national
minorities,209 people with such characteristics are often concentrated together
geographically.210 By mapping “hot spots” in crime-laden urban neighborhoods,
law enforcement offcers can target marginalized community members indirectly.
A consequence of thus deploying police will be to incapacitate offenders for some
crimes caused by unfortunate social and economic circumstances beyond their
control. Indeed, statistical regression models indicate that neighborhood context
may be the greatest contributor to racial disparities in violent behavior.211
Social and structural factors used for predictive policing are self-reinforcing,
because increased police presence in low-income neighborhoods will lead to a
higher rate of detection there.212 For instance, even if race has no bearing on drug
use, users who are Black will be arrested at greater rates if police spend more time
patrolling neighborhoods where residents are disproportionately Black.213 Police
will not only uncover more crime where they are deployed, they will also generate
crime, as contentious interactions between civilians and police often result in
arrests.214 To the extent police use historical arrest data to guide resource

206. See Dawinder S. Sidhu, Moneyball Sentencing, 56 B.C.L. REV. 671, 721 (2015) (noting that “individuals
who live in areas of concentrated poverty unjustifably face the prospect of an adverse risk profle” for reasons
beyond their control).
207. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 570–71.
208. Noting the unreliability of instruments used to predict dangerousness, the RAND report observed that
instead “short-term negative changes in life circumstances may sharply increase criminal activity,” whereas “such
positive short-term changes as living with a girlfriend, attending school, or receiving justice system supervision
may decrease the odds of recidivism.” See WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME
FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 91 (2013) (emphasis added), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf. Similarly, the Virginia Sentencing Commission’s
system of scoring dangerousness has offenders receiving “dangerousness” points for being nineteen or younger,
unemployed, male, and single. See VIRGINIA SENTENCING GUIDELINES (VA. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
209. See Sidhu, supra note 206, at 695.
210. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the Criminal History Category: The
Refnement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 137 (2003).
211. See Robert J. Sampson et al., Social Anatomy of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Violence, 96 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 224, 231 (2005).
212. Harcourt, supra note 210, at 135.
213. See id. at 146.
214. Nirej S. Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1213 (2011).
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allocation, predictive methods will entrench past racial bias in perpetuity.215 One
prominent critic of actuarial prediction, legal and political theorist Bernard
Harcourt, suggests that this impact on racial minorities is intentional rather than
incidental.216 Harcourt observes that race had been openly used to evaluate
offender dangerousness in parole decisions throughout much of the twentieth
century.217 Only after the explicit use of race became politically unacceptable
during the 1960s did criminal history become the most relied-upon predictor of
dangerousness. Given that African Americans have long been overrepresented in
prison populations, Harcourt reasons that the choice to use criminal history was
made with an expectation of a racially disparate impact.218
In sum, clinical predictions of dangerousness appear to lack validity unless they
are based on either a diagnosis of anti-social personality disorder, or statistical
predictors that could be used for an actuarial assessment. Even predictions based
on anti-social personality disorder are probably not reliable enough to justify
confnement as cost-effective. Actuarial models tend to over-predict future dangerousness and their use will recommend more incarceration than is benefcial to
public welfare. By attributing crime to offender dispositions, the use of such
instruments discourages interventions in criminogenic environmental circumstances, including both situational and biographical infuences on behavior. If such
interventions can prevent crime at less social cost, incapacitation of individuals—
which prevents prosocial as well as antisocial conduct at great expense—is
unwarranted. In addition, the heavy reliance of actuarial tools on past criminal
history imposes a disproportionate toll on African American and Latino communities.219 These minority populations suffer a “ratchet effect” because criminal
history triggers more police attention and higher sentences.220
In deciding whether to incapacitate offenders, legislatures should weigh the
social value of confning true positives—those correctly predicted to commit
violent offenses—against the social cost of confning both true and false positives.
The trade-off between prevention and its costs requires a contestable value
judgment. But that judgment cannot even be made without estimating the number
of true and false positives. The Supreme Court should not approve sentences as
proportionate to the goal of incapacitation without evidence that the selection was

215. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 240 (“[Racial] imbalance will get incrementally worse each year if law
enforcement departments rely on the evidence of last year’s correctional traces—arrest or conviction rates—when
setting next year’s profling targets.”).
216. Id. at 238.
217. Id. (noting that the use of race to predict dangerousness “ebbed in the 1970s as a result of the Civil Rights
movement . . . but was nevertheless replaced with two other trends—the narrowing of the prediction instruments
and the focusing of those tools on prior criminal history”).
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 240.
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based on defensible methods of prediction, and that the social costs of confnement, and of prediction itself, were considered.
III. FLAWED PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF INCAPACITATION: SITUATIONISM AND
THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR
The previous Part showed there is little evidence that modern incapacitation
strategies can signifcantly reduce violent crime at an acceptable cost. Yet the case
for incapacitation is often presented as a matter of common-sense rather than
empirical analysis. Both James Q. Wilson and Justice O’Connor, writing for the
majority in Ewing, treated the preventive effects of incapacitation as self-evident.
Such unrefective equation of confnement with prevention refects the widely
shared assumption that crime must be caused by character. This Part critiques that
assumption by reviewing psychological research in the feld of Attribution Theory.
This research shows both the causal infuence of situations on behavior, and the
tendency of lay observers to underestimate that infuence.
Attribution theory describes the process by which people attribute each other’s
behavior to causes either internal and person-specifc (“dispositional”) or external
and context-specifc (“situational”).221 A dispositionalist approach to punishment
assumes that “[c]rime resides within the person and is caused by the way he thinks,
not his environment.”222 By contrast, a situationist approach to punishment
construes criminal behavior by examining the immediate situational contexts in
which behavior occurs and the biographical contexts that shape behavior over
time. These biographical contexts can infuence behavior by affecting norms,
preferences, skills, and opportunities; by affecting emotion; and by affecting
physiology.223 Most contemporary psychologists view behavior as a product of the
interaction among dispositions, biographical contexts, and situational contexts.224

221. See Laura J. Templeton & Timothy F. Hartnagel, Causal Attributions of Crime and the Public’s
Sentencing Goals, 54 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 44, 45–46 (2012).
222. Haney, supra note 164, at 516, 526 (citation omitted). At the cognitive level, “disposition” refers to a
probability that a person will exhibit a specifc behavior contingent on various situational factors. These
probabilities, while affected by genetic makeup, are constantly “updated” to refect information collected by
experience, so that, for instance, the probability that person X will commit crime Y increases after traumatic
experience Z. A disposition is subject to constant change early in life then gradually stabilizes, but never becomes
fxed.
223. Id. at 569–70 (citation omitted) (“In spite of recent, extremist attempts to dispositionalize and biologize
crime, modern psychological research and theory clearly support the view that the roots of criminal behavior are
to be found in the social and developmental histories of those who perform it, and the social context in which it
occurs.”); see also Michelle A. Coyne & John E. Eck, Situational Choice and Crime Events, 31 J. CONTEMP. CRIM.
JUST. 12, 16 (2015) (distinguishing situational infuences of “proximate settings” and “distal social structures and
institutions”).
224. David. C. Funder, Towards a Resolution of the Personality Triad: Persons, Situations and Behavior, 40 J.
RES. PERSONALITY 21, 28–29 (2006); Ryne A. Sherman et al., The Independent Effects of Personality and
Situations on Real-Time Expressions of Behavior and Emotion, 109 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872,
886 (2015).
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A. A Situationist Critique of Incapacitation Theory
Penal incapacitation is arguably based on a confused account of human
behavior. While arguing that situational strategies are necessary to control prisoners, incapacitation theory assumes that criminal behavior is generated by an
offender’s dangerous disposition: that “[c]rime resides within the person and is
‘caused’ by the way he thinks, not his environment.”225 Selective incapacitation
conceptualizes dangerousness as a personal, immutable characteristic that can be
observed and detected.226 But if dangerousness is truly a fxed component of
individuals, why is it so diffcult to accurately predict who engages in violence in
the future? Perhaps because most violence is not simply a product of individual
disposition but is rather an effect of the dynamic interaction between individuals
and their social environments, with the latter sometimes overwhelming the
former.227 In light of evidence that incarcerating more people for longer does not
reduce crime,228 crime control would be better advanced by directing resources to
situational and biographical causes of crime.229
In offering a situationist critique of incapacitation, we do not claim that human
behavior is exclusively generated by situational cues. Rather, we share the
prevailing view that behavior proceeds from the interaction among disposition,
biography, and situation.230 Nor do we deny that some people may be disposed to
engage in violence even under favorable circumstances. Yet much of this dispositionallycaused crime is committed by a small percentage of offenders who exhibit
antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy.231 While these individuals are
225. Haney, supra note 164, at 526.
226. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 300 (“At the heart of this construction is . . . an assertion, based on the
fact of persistent illegal conduct, of what he or she must inherently be.”). See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02
(2015) (providing that a general purpose of criminal law is to control “persons whose conduct indicates that they
are disposed to commit crimes”).
227. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 502–03 (citations omitted) (citing empirical research “that variations
in social setting and context play an extremely important causal role in the incidence of criminality, aggression
and violence, homicide, and even torture” and that “exposure to a variety of background situations and
developmental context (e.g., poverty and parental maltreatment) constitutes a signifcant risk factor in delinquency and adult criminal behavior”).
228. See OLIVER ROEDER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE? 4 (2015),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/fles/publications/What_Caused_The_Crime_Decline.pdf.
229. See, e.g., Haney, supra note 164, at 503–04 (“[E]xclusively individual-centered approaches to crime
control like imprisonment are self-limiting and doomed to failure if they do not simultaneously address
criminogenic situational and contextual factors[.]”).
230. Sherman et al., supra note 224, at 886.
231. Kent A. Kiehl et al., Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Revealed
by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 682 (2001) (“The results support
the hypothesis that criminal psychopathy is associated with abnormalities in the function of structures in the
limbic system and frontal cortex while engaged in processing of affective stimuli.”); see also David J. Cooke
et al., Casting Light on Prison Violence in Scotland, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1065, 1075 (2008) (explaining that
when criminogenic environment of prison is ameliorated, “residual violence will be ‘person centered,’ and can be
addressed as such” and further explaining that one defnition of “dispositional crime” is crime that most
individuals would not commit were they placed in a situation identical to that in which the crime is committed).
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disproportionately present in prison populations, they nonetheless comprise a
relatively small minority of prisoners.232 Even if it is justifable to incapacitate past
violent offenders presenting such disorders, limiting incapacitation to this population would greatly reduce its scale. Moreover, policy interventions affecting
biographical infuences on disposition may reduce the scope of necessary incapacitation further.
Empirical research over the course of the twentieth century built toward the
conclusion that personal traits are less stable than lay people assume, and
situations play a major and often dominant role in shaping behavior. Psychologists
have shown that “individual responses to specifc situations are surprisingly
consistent across persons,” whereas one person’s behavior across different situations is extremely variable.233 In particular, two famous experiments showed that
most people will engage in cruelty or violence in certain situations, and will
impose arbitrary suffering upon an undeserving victim. This should cause us to
question that offenders are “of ‘a different breed’ and necessarily wicked.”234
In 1961, psychologist Stanley Milgram conducted an experiment in which he
directed the subject (assigned the role of “teacher”) to give a series of increasingly
painful electric shocks to another participant (the “learner”) sitting on the opposite
side of a wall.235 The learner was in fact Milgram’s assistant.236 The teacher was
instructed to ask the learner a series of questions; with each incorrect answer, the
teacher was told to administer an increasingly powerful shock.237 As the shocks
escalated, the teacher began to hear the learner screaming, complaining of chest
pains, banging on the wall, and pleading to stop the experiment.238 Beginning at
330 volts, the shocks met with silence.239 Before the experiment, Milgram polled
psychiatrists, members of Yale’s faculty, random middle-class adults, and students,
all of whom predicted that subjects would refuse the experiment.240 Psychiatrists
“expected that only 4 percent would reach 300 volts, and that only a pathological
fringe of about one in a thousand would administer the highest shock . . . .”241
Incredibly, 65% of subject teachers delivered the maximum 450-volt shock, and all
subjects delivered shocks of at least 300 volts.242 The results suggested that most
people would commit antisocial acts—including acts of violence and cruelty—if

232. See supra Section II.C.1.
233. Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of Blame,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1395 (2003).
234. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 300.
235. Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 373 (1963).
236. Id. (noting that the subject believed that the roles of Teacher and Learner were randomly assigned at the
outset of the experiment).
237. Id. (noting that the shock switches were labeled to indicate the level of danger posed).
238. Id. at 374.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 375.
241. Stanley Milgram, The Perils of Obedience, HARPER’S MAG., Dec. 1973, at 64.
242. Milgram, supra note 235, at 375–76.
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ordered to by an authority fgure. Moreover, the dispositions encouraging such
behavior are not inherently antisocial. To the contrary, the deference to authority
and cooperativeness that motivated cruel behavior here, ordinarily encourages
compliance with law.
Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment was another striking
demonstration of how situational forces can overwhelm individual personality
traits and provoke sadistic behavior in normal adults.243 Subjects244 were randomly assigned roles as either a guard or prisoner in Zimbardo’s makeshift
prison.245 Guards were prohibited from hitting or assaulting the prisoners but were
otherwise unrestrained in their treatment of prisoners.246 Internalizing these roles,
the guards began to dispense increasingly harsh and punitive measures when
prisoners resisted their authority.247 They resorted to psychological and physical
abuse without apparent hesitation, while the prisoners grew submissive and
internalized their roles as dehumanized objects of authority.248 Conditions rapidly
deteriorated. Prisoners were forced to defecate in small buckets which they had to
clean with their own hands, subjected to sleep deprivation, compelled to exercise
until physical exhaustion, and confned for hours alone in a small closet.249 By day
three of the planned two-week experiment, one prisoner “began suffering from
acute emotional disturbance, disorganized thinking, uncontrollable crying, and
rage.”250 The experiment, designed to span two weeks, lasted only fve days before
being terminated.251
Zimbardo’s controversial experiment suggests that most people are capable of
cruelty if placed in a situation that tends to elicit cruel behavior.252 This
experiment has been invoked to explain how people become complicit in war
crimes.253 Zimbardo later testifed as to the power of situational forces at a military
hearing in defense of a U.S. soldier charged with abusing prisoners at Abu

243. See, e.g., Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison,
1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 69 (1973).
244. Id. at 73 (explaining that subjects were screened to eliminate individuals with criminal pasts and
psychological problems).
245. Id. at 72.
246. Id. at 74–75.
247. Id. at 89.
248. Id. at 94.
249. Id. at 95.
250. DONALD O. GRANBERG & JOHN F. GALLIHER, A MOST HUMAN ENTERPRISE: CONTROVERSIES IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 42 (2010) (discussing effects of Zimbardo’s experiment on the prisoners).
251. Haney, Banks & Zimbardo, supra note 243, at 81.
252. See, e.g., Susan D. Rozelle, Practice Attributional Charity: Cognitive Bias in Intentional Homicide Law,
47 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 41, 50–51 (2014); Andrew E. Lelling, A Psychological Critique of Character-Based
Theories of Criminal Excuse, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 35, 80–81 (1998).
253. Arthur G. Miller et al., Explaining the Holocaust: Does Social Psychology Exonerate the Perpetrators?,
in UNDERSTANDING GENOCIDE: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HOLOCAUST 301, 313–14 (Leonard S. Newman &
Ralph Erber eds., 2002).
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Ghraib,254 and published a book collecting numerous examples illustrating how
situational forces cause deviant behavior.255
Many people believe that violent actions are sometimes reasonable, and indeed
the enforceability of law requires that the law justify use of force by offcials.256
Legal defenses, including public authority, defensive force, duress, necessity, and
provocation, refect a common understanding that violence can in certain situations be justifed or excused.257 Moreover, these defenses are usually conditioned
on a reasonable balance of interests.258 In this sense the criminality of any
particular act of violence can be located on a spectrum, such that the reasonableness of some acts of criminal violence may fall just short of the threshold required
for justifcation. Despite these subtleties we commonly associate violent crime
with abject depravity. Although popular culture often portrays violent offenders as
predators who gratuitously stalk random strangers, most violent crime occurs in
the gray area where someone is provoked or threatened.259 The point is not that all
people are equally inclined to engage in violence, but that criminal law does not
evaluate violence independently from situational cues.
Many situational determinates of crime are subtle ones that gradually overwhelm one’s ability to resist temptation and impulse.260 It is no coincidence that
violent crime is most common in areas of economic blight261 or that “the most

254. Demonstrating the Power of Social Situations Via a Simulated Prison Experiment, AMERICA PSYCHOLOGIhttp://www.apa.org/research/action/prison.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
255. PHILLIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT 5–8 (2007).
256. Jonathan Jackson, et al., Monopolizing Force? Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward the
Acceptability of Violence, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 479, 486, 490 (2013); GUYORA BINDER, THE OXFORD
INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: CRIMINAL LAW 334–35 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2016); Pillsbury, supra note 160, at
451–52.
257. Pillsbury, supra note 160, at 451–52; Bill McCarthy & John Hagan, Homelessness: A Criminogenic
Situation, 31 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 393 (1991).
258. Pillsbury, supra note 160, at 444–47.
259. See id. at 461–62; Guyora Binder, Homicide, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 702, 702
(Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds. 2014) (“In most societies the majority of homicides are the unlucky
consequences of broadly tolerated routines of violence rooted in conficting claims of social status and justifed by
norms of sociability, loyalty, or honor.”); Dolovich, supra note 104, at 299 (“No doubt there are people in state
custody too violent and dangerous to be released—the Charles Mansons, the Jeffrey Dahmers . . . [b]ut it is hard
to credit the notion that such people are anything but exceptions.”). Moreover, “the vast majority of violent crimes
are assaults where one person hits or slaps another or makes a verbal threat. Only about 8% of the victims of
violent crime nationally went to a hospital emergency room . . . .” Id. at 297 n.117 (quoting a report by the
National Criminal Justice Commission).
260. See Catherine DeCarlo Santiago et al., Socioeconomic Status, Neighborhood Disadvantage, and PovertyRelated Stress: Prospective Effects on Psychological Syndromes Among Diverse Low-income Families, 32 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 218 (2011) (fnding a causal relationship between low income and delinquency).
261. See, e.g., Pablo Fajnzylber et al., What Causes Violent Crime?, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 1323, 1330–31 (2002)
(documenting the positive correlation between violent crime and nations’ GDP from 1970 to 1994); Toby Seddon,
Drugs, Crime and Social Exclusion: Social Context and Social Theory in British Drugs—Crime Research, 46
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 680, 680 (2006) (describing how economic factors affect illicit drug markets); Kevin M.
Drakulich et al., Instability, Informal Control, and Criminogenic Situations: Community Effects of Returning
Prisoners, 57 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 493 (2012); see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 62
CAL ASSOCIATION,
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serious concentrations of human diffculty are invariably found huddled together
with unemployment, poverty, housing decay, and other social disadvantages.”262
Criminologist Toby Seddon suggests that drug trade proliferates in low-income
communities not only to satisfy employment needs, but also “to create a meaningful daily structure and identity.”263 Nor is an adequate response that not everyone
exposed to adverse circumstances eventually becomes violent, for “while it is
possible to overcome horrifc circumstances, horrifc circumstances do have a
marked effect . . . [and] that effect is larger than we are comfortable admitting.”264
Incapacitation ignores these biographical and situational causes of crime by
locating the roots of violent behavior exclusively in the offender’s disposition.
This misattribution is implicit in the development of risk assessment tools, and
allows us to avert our eyes from criminogenic conditions society has the power—
and arguably the responsibility—to alter.
While discounting the role that social and economic factors play in precipitating
violence outside of prisons, incapacitation assumes that situations inside prisons
do not generate criminal behavior.265 Yet many situational aspects of prisons
appear to be criminogenic, and, as previously noted, prisons seem to aggravate
recidivism.266 The constant threat of unprovoked violence tends to cause longterm psychological trauma.267 Disruption of family and community ties “dampen
the internal pressures to abide by law.”268 Abuse by prison guards erodes respect
for authority and damages self-esteem.269 Overcrowding and inhumane prison
conditions add to the physical and psychological trauma endured by many
offenders.270 A dearth of educational and vocational programming further diminishes the likelihood for employment and successful reentry.271

(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977) (noting that in eighteenth century France the public
expressed “agitation . . . against punishments for certain offences connected with social conditions such as petty
larceny”).
262. Seddon, supra note 261, at 680. This position is empirically supported by research on gene-environment
interactions. See, e.g., Hexuan Liu et al., Gene by Social-Environment Interaction for Youth Delinquency and
Violence: Thirty-Nine Aggression-Related Genes, 93 SOC. FORCES 881 (2014).
263. Seddon, supra note 261, at 692.
264. Rozelle, supra note 252, at 43–44.
265. See supra Section II.B.
266. See José Cid, Is Imprisonment Criminogenic?, 6 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 459, 471–72 (2009).
267. Haney, supra note 164, at 538–39 (discussing prison-induced PTSD).
268. Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1056.
269. Haney, supra note 164, at 539–40.
270. Id. at 543–44 (citations omitted) (“A large literature on the consequences of overcrowding has
documented a range of specifc adverse effects on persons confned in prisons and jails, including increases in
negative affect, elevated blood pressure, a greater number of illness complaints, higher rates of disciplinary
infractions, and increased recidivism.”); see Karen F. Lahm, Inmate Assaults on Prison Staff: A Multilevel
Examination of an Overlooked Form of Prison Violence, 89 PRISON J. 131.
271. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010) (“In some prisons, moreover, the system itself becomes
complicit in the lack of development . . . . [I]t is the policy in some prisons to withhold counseling, education, and
rehabilitation programs for those who are ineligible for parole consideration.”).
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To be fair, there are many prisoners whose impulsivity and indifference to
suffering threaten the safety of others, even outside of criminogenic situations.272
By one estimate, roughly 15–25% of male prisoners are psychopathic.273 Yet the
resulting violence is part of the situation facing other prisoners, and further
contributes to that situation’s criminogenic effects. The prevalence of dispositionallycaused violence pressures the other 75–85% of prisoners to engage in defensive
violence or preemptive displays of aggression as means of adaptation and
survival.274 As a result, they may be infuenced in ways that render them more
likely to commit crimes on the outside.275
Yet even psychopaths are more likely to act violently as a result of unfavorable
social conditions. Although psychopathy has been associated with abnormal brain
function, such malfunction is more likely in response to an array of biographical
aggravators, including poverty, child abuse, low socioeconomic status, and low
parental education.276 Whether these contextual factors actually trigger psychopathic “externalization” depends on an individual’s genetic sensitivity and the
nature of the situational conditions to which the individual is exposed.277 For
instance, psychopathic symptoms increase within days of incarceration.278 That at
least some types of psychopathy appear responsive to therapeutic intervention
further undermines the notion that fxed dispositional qualities underlie antisocial
behavior. One researcher notes that “a relatively brief and focused contextual
intervention in the frst grade can have . . . a dramatic effect on growth of serious
forms of antisocial behavior in adolescence.”279 Other researchers have reported
that cognitive-behavioral therapy effectively treats at least certain types of
psychopathy.280
Recent research has indicated the interaction of genetic endowments and
biographical context in the development of psychopathic behavioral symptoms.
Researchers report that males with a certain variant of the gene Monoamine
Oxidase A (“MAOA”) who witnessed acts of violence in childhood were more
likely to engage in violence, impulsivity, aggression, and antisocial behavior later

272. Kent A. Kiehl & Morris B. Hoffman, The Criminal Psychopath: History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and
Economics, 51 JURIMETRICS 355, 355–56 (2011). The authors also report that psychopaths are four to eight times
more likely than other prisoners to commit violent crimes after released. Id. at 355.
273. Id. at 356; see also STOP PRISONER RAPE, supra note 167, at 11.
274. See Jenny Tew et al., Prison Culture and Prison Violence, 221 PRISON SERV. J. 15, 15–16 (2015).
275. See Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1099.
276. See Javdani N. Sadeh et al., Serotonin Transporter Gene Associations with Psychopathic Traits in Youth
Vary as a Function of Socioeconomic Resources, 119 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 604, 608 (2010).
277. See id.
278. Haney, supra note 164, at 534.
279. Thomas J. Dishion & Gerald R. Patterson, The Development and Ecology of Antisocial Behavior: Linking
Etiology, Prevention, and Treatment, in 3 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 658 (Dante Cicchetti ed., 2016).
280. See Callie H. Burt & Ronald L. Simons, Pulling Back the Curtain on Heritability Studies: Biosocial
Criminology in the Postgenomic Era, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 223, 249 (2014).
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in life.281 Without exposure to such situations, however, men with the high-risk
MAOA variant were not behaviorally different from men with the low-risk
variant.282 Other historical factors that produce antisocial behavior in combination
with MAOA are social exclusion,283 childhood maltreatment, “material deprivation,” and low education level.284 These fndings confrm that, even among people
who are in some sense more “predisposed” to antisocial behavior than others,
propensities toward violence can be expressed or suppressed based on contextual
factors amenable to policy intervention.285
Environmental hazards also have a surprising causal role in disposition-based
behavior. Consider the apparent relationship between violent crime and lead-based
products.286 Researchers report a striking correlation across countries, states,
cities, and even neighborhoods between consumption of leaded gasoline and rates
of violent crime.287 Brain images of people with moderate lead exposure show
reduced functionality in areas of the brain responsible for emotional regulation,
impulse control, executive function, and communication.288 Indeed, some scholars
believe that the elimination of leaded gasoline was the most important factor in the
dramatic drop in homicide rates during the 1990s—far more important than any
incapacitative or deterrent effects of increased imprisonment.289
A rational alternative to divining and punishing evil disposition is to mitigate the
social conditions that make expression of deviance more likely. This would mean
investing in intervention rather than incapacitation—reducing poverty, expanding
social investment in child welfare and education, and ameliorating environmental

281. Rose McDermott et al., MAOA and Aggression: A Gene-Environment Interaction in Two Populations, 57
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1043, 1043, 1058 (2012).
282. Id. at 1057.
283. D. Gallardo-Pujol et al., MAOA Genotype, Social Exclusion and Aggression: An Experimental Test of a
Gene-Environment Interaction, 12 GENES BRAIN & BEHAV. 140, 140 (2012).
284. David Fergusson et al., Moderating Role of the MAOA Genotype in Antisocial Behaviour, 200 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 116, 121 (2012).
285. In fact, biologists believe that individuals with heightened vulnerability to negative environments exhibit
heightened potential for success in positive environments. Jay Belsky, Differential Susceptibility to Environmental Infuences, 7 INT’L J. CHILD CARE & EDUC. POL’Y 15 (2013); David Dobbs, The Science of Success, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/12/the-science-of-success/307761.
286. See Kevin Drum, Lead: America’s Real Criminal Element, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.
motherjones.com/environment/2016/02/lead-exposure-gasoline-crime-increase-children-health (“Gasoline lead
may explain as much as 90 percent of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century.”); Kim M. Cecil
et al., Decreased Brain Volume in Adults with Childhood Lead Exposure, 5 PLOS MED. 741, 741 (2008)
(concluding that childhood lead exposure is associated with reductions in gray matter in prefrontal cortex); Rick
Nevin, Understanding International Crime Trends: The Legacy of Preschool Lead Exposure, 104 ENVTL. RES.
315, 315 (2007) (fnding “very strong association between preschool blood lead and subsequent crime rate trends”
across nine countries).
287. Drum, supra note 286.
288. See id.
289. See id.; Jessica Wolpaw Reyes, Environmental Policy as Social Policy? The Impact of Childhood Lead
Exposure on Crime (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13097, 2007); PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET
FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 170–74 (2009).
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hazards. Such a strategy would aim at fostering prosocial dispositions and enabling
prosocial behavior, rather than trying to identify and incapacitate antisocial
dispositions.
B. Attribution Error and Excessive Blame
The previous Section described how antisocial behavior arises through a
combination of genetic endowments, biographical infuences, and situational
infuences. This Section explains why both the public and legal decision-makers
systematically underestimate the substantial contribution of situational infuences
to antisocial behavior. Similarly, it explains why voters, legislators, and judges
simply presume that crime is caused by character, rather than basing their
understanding of crime on empirical evidence. To all of these actors, the responsibility of criminals for crime is a matter of common sense. To the extent that we see
crime as evidence of bad character, we will see constant confrmation of the
assumption that people of bad character are disposed to commit crimes.
Our weak ability to perceive situational causes of crime is a result of attribution
errors documented by cognitive psychology. Foremost among these is the Fundamental Attribution Error (“FAE”), the tendency for observers to overestimate the
role of dispositional factors in explaining behavior, while failing to recognize
situational forces at play.290 FAE induces us to attribute crime entirely to an
offender’s disposition.291 By magnifying the causal role of a defendant’s character
relative to other variables affecting behavior, FAE induces excessive blame, which
in turn encourages excessive punishment.292 Incapacitation theory purports to
promote utility, without regard to desert, but humans cannot overcome their own
cognitive biases just by stipulating them away. A utilitarian may reject retribution
as an aim of punishment, but cannot so easily resist attribution.
Early experiments establishing the Fundamental Attribution Error demonstrated
the irrational resistance of subjects to situational explanations of behavior.293 In
1967, Edward Jones and Victor Harris divided students into two groups and
instructed them to read an essay by a student who had been assigned either to
support or oppose Fidel Castro.294 Both groups were then asked to rate the writers’
“true” beliefs regarding Castro.295 Even knowing that the writer had no choice
over what to write, subjects who had read the pro-Castro essay rated the writer’s
beliefs as far more pro-Castro than did the students who read the anti-Castro essay,

290.
291.
292.
293.
(1967).
294.
295.

Ross, supra note 21.
Dripps, supra note 233, at 1399.
See id. at 1428.
Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, The Attribution of Attitudes, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3
Id. at 4, 8.
Id.
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and vice versa.296 Hence, subjects failed to account for salient situational constraints and accordingly drew baseless conclusions about authors’ positions on a
controversial topic. In another classic experiment, observers rated basketball
players shooting free throws in a well-lit gymnasium as signifcantly more skilled
than basketball players in a dimly-lit gymnasium, even though the former (who
were in fact no more skilled) held a clear situational advantage.297 Over-attribution
of outcomes to individuals appears to be partly culturally determined, as the effect
is more pronounced in Western cultures and particularly in the United States.298
FAE is notable for the strength of its effect on the observer. For instance,
subjects in one study were told that Person A had been more honest or friendly than
Person B on a particular occasion, then asked to estimate the probability that
Person A would also be more honest or friendly in a subsequent situation.299
Whereas the actual probability (based on other studies of cross-situational behavior) was roughly 55%, subjects on average estimated an 80% likelihood.300 This
remained true even “when the question spelled out the nature of the situation,
making it very clear that participants were being asked to predict behavior in a
very different kind of situation.”301 More generally, correlation in trait-related
behavior in two separate situations eliciting certain traits (like honesty or friendliness) is 0.15, but is perceived to be 0.80.302 So, not only do we overestimate the
consistency and relevance of intrinsic character, we overestimate substantially.
A related cognitive bias is the Just World Fallacy, the assumption that consequences of an action refect the morality of the actor.303 We attribute the misfortune
of others to dispositional faws rather than external factors, in order to preserve our
belief that people usually get what they deserve. Taking a more situationist
perspective on behavior would be psychologically unsettling and cognitively
taxing, because situational forces are more diffcult to ascertain and control.
Borrowing from Milgram, Melvin Lerner documented the Just World Fallacy by
having subjects watch what they believed was a live video of a volunteer receiving
painful electric shocks.304 One group of subjects was permitted to intervene, while

296. Id. at 7, 11.
297. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1397.
298. Salil K. Mehra, Blaming: Harm Attribution in the United States and Japan, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 39 (2013);
Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide: How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are
Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY L.J. 311, 380–81 (2008) (citations omitted) (“A burgeoning cultural-psychology
literature shows how Western cultures tend to be more dispositionist than Eastern cultures.”).
299. See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION 432–34 (1999).
300. Id. at 434.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 433–34.
303. Adrian Furnham, Belief in a Just World: Research Progress Over the Past Decade, 34 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 795, 802–03 (2003).
304. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human
Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 101–02 (2004).
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the other had no choice to but continue watching.305 Afterwards, subjects given no
choice to intervene were far more critical and disparaging in their feedback of the
volunteers and awarded them less compensation.306 In Lerner’s own words, “the
sight of an innocent person suffering without the possibility of reward or compensation motivated people to devalue the attractiveness of the victim in order to bring
about a more appropriate ft between her fate and her character.”307 The lesson:
rather than accept that bad things happen to good people, we prefer to think of
people to whom bad things happen as bad.
Attribution errors affect every part of our justice system.308 For instance, jurors
often treat as highly probative a confession that is patently coerced,309 attributing
the confession to the individual’s guilty conscience even when the coercive factors
producing the confession have been explained to them.310 Factfnders infer guilt
based on seemingly irrelevant character evidence.311 Factfnders exhibiting strong
just-world beliefs are more likely to impose longer sentences on individuals from
low socioeconomic profles.312 Some psychologists believe this phenomenon
explains juror attribution of blame to rape victims and skepticism regarding claims
of abuse.313
Attribution biases infuence our perception of entire groups, not just individuals.314 A meta-analysis of empirical studies concluded that group members are
more likely to attribute positive behavior of fellow group members to dispositional
qualities and negative behaviors to situational factors.315 On the other hand, we
generally attribute negative behavior of members of groups to which we do not
belong to dispositional traits common to all members of that group.316 These
patterns can affect sentencing:317 “White jurors more readily believe that blacks

305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 101 (quoting Melvin L. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, The Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead,
85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1030, 1032 (1978)).
308. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1385–86 (proposing that the fundamental attribution error “has important
and disturbing implications for the theory and practice of criminal law” and that its existence helps explain the
doctrines of attempt and felony murder); Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky, Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges
to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (2003) (explaining the failure of entrapment claims
in terms of dispositional attribution errors).
309. See Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions, and Mock
Jury Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489, 489 (1981).
310. See id.
311. Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 528–29 (1983).
312. See id.; Naomi J. Freeman, Socioeconomic Status and Belief in a Just World: Sentencing of Criminal
Defendants, 36 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2379, 2387–88 (2006).
313. Rozelle, supra note 252, at 48.
314. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326.
315. Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871, 903
(2015).
316. See Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326.
317. See id.
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will continue to be dangerous in the future and are more likely to ignore mitigating
evidence, treating instances of the defendant’s bad character as more representative of the ‘true character’ of people of ‘his kind’ than instances of good
behavior.”318
C. Attribution Errors and Incapacitation Theory
Attribution errors are likely to distort decision-making within institutions
pursuing the goal of incapacitation, causing decision-makers to over-attribute
crime to dispositions and so to over-predict recidivism.319 Yet attribution error not
only distorts our judgment of offenders, it also distorts our judgment of incapacitation theory itself, lending it unmerited credibility.320 This Section argues that
incapacitation’s key assumptions are all bolstered by cognitive misattribution.
The most important assumption of penal incapacitation is that past offenders are
likely to reoffend. This assumption is unexceptionable if interpreted to mean only
that past offenders are, in the aggregate, somewhat more likely to offend than the
general population. After all, if some persons are disposed to offend at a high rate,
and these are over-represented among offenders, offenders as a group will be more
likely to offend than the general public. Yet thus interpreted, the assumption would
not justify incapacitation as welfare maximizing. The Fundamental Attribution
Error reassures us that each offender is disposed to commit crime. When Wilson
insists that incapacitation requires no assumptions about human nature,321 he
implies that we need not know or alter the situational determinants of crime in
order to prevent it. When the Supreme Court in Ewing and other cases approves
recidivist sentencing enhancements on the ground that recidivists “by repeated
criminal acts have shown that they are simply incapable of conforming to the
norms of society” it treats offenses themselves as conclusive evidence that
offenses are entirely caused by dispositions.322 In treating recidivism as selfexplanatory, Justice O’Connor ignored the fact that convictions makes reintegration diffcult, by restricting an offender’s social and economic opportunities.323

318. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
121, 126 (2006); see also Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence,
Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 768 n.53 (2005).
319. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1428–29; Lelling, supra note 252, at 39.
320. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character,
Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 303 (2003) (“If . . . fundamental
attribution error contributes to false impressions and self-understandings, and misguided legal theories and laws,
then it should fnd support in the major social policy disputes that animate and defne our history.”); Dolovich,
supra note 104, at 305 (“The appeal of the individualist framework is not hard to fathom. If the causes of crime are
wholly internal, exclusively the product of an individual’s inherent disposition, crime prevention becomes a
simple matter: get rid of the criminals.”).
321. See WILSON, supra note 40, at 145–46.
322. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)).
323. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 104, at 280–82.
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Thus recidivism can as easily be explained by situational as by dispositional
factors.
The second assumption of incapacitation theory—that incapacitated criminals
will not be replaced—is also bolstered by attribution errors.324 Studies consistently
show that people underestimate the degree to which discrete situations elicit the
same behavior from different people.325 Replacement effects are not unique to
illegal drug markets. In a study about the effcacy of administrative segregation,
prison administrators noticed that segregating disruptive prisoners simply gave
rise to “a new crop” of problematic prisoners.326 The natural organization of prison
into a hierarchy of social roles likely had more to do with generating disruptive
behavior than any of the individual prisoners.327 As noted above, robbery and
burglary are often committed in groups as well.328 Crime is committed in groups
for the same reason that most other human activities take place in groups—because
people are sociable. And as Milgram and Zimbardo demonstrated, most people
will do what those around them seem to expect of them. If much crime is generated
by social infuences that would lead most similarly situated people to commit the
same crime, then incapacitation does not systematically target crime so much as it
targets individuals who “lack the ability to extricate themselves from . . . crimeproducing settings.”329
Attribution error similarly causes courts and policymakers to underestimate the
possibility that incarceration increases the rate of offending after release.330
Physically and psychologically traumatized, prisoners may leave prison more
likely to commit violent crime than when they entered,331 less employable, and
more likely to form social relationships with others who have been similarly
stigmatized. Attribution of offending to disposition effaces these social infuences
on offending.
That most behavior appears consistent with both situational and dispositional
inferences allows attribution errors to go undetected over time: “[b]ecause the
people we observe will tend to behave as if they are motivated by disposition and
not situation, the data we collect will appear to confrm our fawed dispositionist
conception of the humans we are observing[.]”332 This is how attribution errors

324. See supra Section II.B.
325. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1395.
326. Cooke et al., supra note 231, at 1072.
327. See Sharon Dolovich, Two Models of the Prison: Accidental Humanity and Hypermasculinity in the L.A.
County Jail, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 965, 1011 (2012).
328. Piquero & Blumstein, supra note 48, at 272–74.
329. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
330. See Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 308, at 1100–01.
331. See Pritikin, supra note 73, at 1054–55.
332. Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 320, at 176.
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sustain the backwards logic of incapacitation.333 It induces us to reinterpret every
instance of deviant conduct as an expression of antisocial character, thereby
reinforcing our common sense view that character causes conduct.
IV. INCAPACITATION AS SEGREGATION RATHER THAN CRIME CONTROL
As we have observed, utilitarianism is fundamentally egalitarian. Within a given
society, the pursuit of “public utility”334 weighs equally the welfare of all and
pursues “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” regardless of their
identities.335 Thus, from a utilitarian perspective, the utility of prisoners counts as
part of the public utility, and the harm to offenders is a cost that makes punishment,
insofar as applied, always a necessary evil.336 Penal incapacitation cannot be fairly
characterized as serving public utility, unless the crime prevented outside of prison
exceeds the resulting crime that occurs in prison, including crime committed
against prisoners. Crime prevented must also be weighed against any additional
crime outside of prison generated by incarceration, and any additional social
costs.337
Judged by the standard of utility, modern incapacitation strategies have failed.
The shift from rehabilitative to incapacitative aims has been accompanied by a
great increase in incarceration and its social cost, with at most a small effect on
violent crime.338 Our very limited ability to predict which offenders will commit
violent crimes precludes a strategy of selective incapacitation. While purporting to
select for dangerousness, we have effectively adopted a strategy of collective
incapacitation and thereby achieved mass incarceration, at a substantial expenditure of resources and waste of human capacity. Since incapacitation strategies do
not achieve utility, it seems probable that they have prevailed and persisted
because of their distributive or expressive effects.

333. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 278; Donald Braman et al., Some Realism about Punishment
Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1600–01 (2010).
334. Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism & Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS
L.J. 115, 166–68 (2000); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
11–13 (J.H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Clarendon Press 1996) (distinguishing public utility and private utility).
335. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 393 (J. H.
Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1977).
336. See, e.g., G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 8 (1971).
337. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2490 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If imprisonment does
nothing else, it removes the criminal from the general population and prevents him from committing additional
crimes in the outside world.”) (emphasis added); Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 514 (“If the aim of
incarceration is a social good . . . then the social costs of incarceration must be included when assessing whether a
net good is really being achieved.”).
338. RYAN S. KING ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Incarceration & Crime: A Complex Relationship 2–4
(2005) (fnding that although violent crime dropped by 34% between 1991 and 2003, only about one-fourth of this
was due to increased incarceration, presumably involving some undetermined combination of incapacitative and
deterrent effects).
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This Part explores these distributive and expressive dimensions of incapacitation. It argues that the effect of incapacitation strategies is less to reduce the cost of
crime and crime control than to redistribute it to offenders and their communities,339 and to thereby stigmatize them as less worthy of social protection.
Moreover, the fact that African Americans bear a disproportionate share of this
redistributed risk gives this stigma further signifcance as a continuation of the
legacy of slavery and segregation.
A. Crime in Prison
As we have seen, incapacitation theory rests on the assumption that violent
crime is dispositional—that its cause inheres in the characters of those who
commit it, rather than their social circumstances. On this assumption, the transfer
of violent offenders from one social environment to another might not be expected
to alter their rates of offending. The assumption that incarceration incapacitates
potential offenders requires that either (1) violent crime will not occur in prison at
equal or greater rates, or (2) violent crime in prison simply does not count. That
Wilson did not specify any empirical assumption about the effectiveness of prison
in suppressing violence when he frst proposed a strategy of incapacitation
suggests the second alternative: that he was not counting the welfare of prisoners
as part of the social welfare calculus.
It is widely acknowledged that violence occurs in prison, although prisoners
may face retaliation if they report assaults by either fellow prisoners or guards, and
prison offcials may have little incentive to ascertain and publicly acknowledge the
extent of violence.340 Prisons were particularly violent in the 1970s when Wilson
frst proposed that incarceration be increased. Offcially reported prison homicide
rates ranged as high as 600 per 100,000 inmates in some states.341 For 1972, the
rate of offcially reported homicides for prisons nationwide was 70 per 100,000,
compared to 7 for the nation as a whole.342 Suicide is also an important metric of
prison violence, as it is often an effort to escape constant threats of violence from
other prisoners, and homicides may be misclassifed as suicides by authorities.343
In 1980, the offcially reported prison homicide rate was 54 per 100,000 and the

339. See Susan Dimock, Criminalizing Dangerousness: How to Preventively Detain Dangerous Offenders, 9
CRIM. L. & PHIL. 537, 540 (2015) (“Incapacitation as a tool of crime control affects the rate of crime, not by
changing offenders or their social conditions, but by ‘rearranging the distribution of offenders in society.’”).
340. Ahmed A. White, The Concept of “Less Eligibility” and the Social Function of Prison Violence in Class
Society, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 737, 757 (2008).
341. See DAVID A. JONES, THE HEALTH RISKS OF IMPRISONMENT 151–55 (1976); LEE H. BOWKER, PRISON
VICTIMIZATION 23 (1980).
342. Colin C. Carriere, The Dilemma of Individual Violence in Prisons, 6 NEW ENG. J. PRISON L. 195, 202
(1980).
343. California Corrections: Confronting Institutional Crisis, Lethal Injection, and Sentencing Reform in
2007, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 117, 121 (2008).
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suicide rate was 34 per 100,000.344 In 1983, jails reported a very low homicide rate
of 5 per 100,000, but an astronomical suicide rate of 129.345 Assault was also
prevalent, as a 1977 study of North Carolina prisons reported an offcial rate of
7,000 per 100,000, while a victim survey found that 78% of inmates reported
suffering assaults.346 Sexual assault was also prevalent, although rarely reported.
Some victim surveys reported rape rates as high as 14,000 per 100,000, while even
higher numbers of inmates reported being sexually assaulted or harassed.347 In
light of these data it does not seem that incarceration was inhibiting violent
offending by prisoners during the period when Wilson proposed his incapacitation
strategy. Indeed, it seems likely that prison conditions were having a criminogenic
effect.
As incarcerations rates rose, inmate homicide and suicide rates fell. From 1980
to 2002, prison homicide rates dropped from 54 to 4 per 100,000 and suicide rates
dropped from 34 to 14. From 1983 to 2002, jail homicide rates dropped from 5 to 3
per 100,000 and suicide rates dropped from 129 to 47.348 These declines have been
ascribed to better security measures, better emergency medical care, and a greater
proportion of nonviolent offenders in the now much larger inmate population.349
On the other hand, rates of assault and sexual assault remained high. A 2007 study
found that physical assault against a male is roughly 18 times more likely in prison
than in the general population.350 While the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported a
rate of only 315 sexual assaults per 100,000 reported to prison authorities in
2004,351 a 2003 Human Rights Watch analysis of victim surveys estimated that
between 10% and 30% of prison and jail inmates had been sexually assaulted.352
The failure of incapacitation’s proponents to consider prison violence suggests
that their aim was not to reduce the risk of violent crime as such, but to redistribute
that risk from innocents to past offenders.353 Indifference to violence among

344. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUICIDE AND HOMICIDE IN STATE PRISONS AND
LOCAL JAILS 2 (2005).
345. Id.
346. Seventy-eight percent of inmates reported being assaulted within the past year, but did not indicate how
often. Dan A. Fuller & Thomas Orsagh, Violence and Victimization Within a State Prison System, 2 CRIM. JUST.
REV. 35 (1977).
347. See Helen M. Eigenberg, Rape in Male Prisons: Examining the Relationship Between Correctional
Offcers’ Attitudes Toward Male Rape and Their Willingness to Respond to Acts of Rape, in PRISON VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 145 (Michael C. Braswell et al. eds., 1994); Daniel Lockwood, Issues in Prison Sexual Violence, in
PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 97 (Michael C. Braswell et al. eds., 1994).
348. MUMOLA, supra note 344, at 2.
349. Id.
350. Wolff et al., supra note 168, at 595.
351. ALLEN J. BECK & TIMOTHY A. HUGHES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORTED BY
CORRECTIONAL AUTHORITIES, 2004 4 (2005)
352. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO ESCAPE: MALE RAPE IN U.S. PRISONS (2003), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/
reports/2001/prison/report.html.
353. See Dimock, supra note 339, at 551 (“Violent offenders forfeit their right not to be used for social beneft
in this way, in consequence of acting in ways that forfeit their entitlement to a presumption of harmlessness; the
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inmates is inconsistent with the utilitarian premise that the welfare of all members
of society counts equally. Indeed, the position that only non-offenders deserve
protection from violence would seem to be a principle of retributive desert rather
than utility. We might better refer to the aim of separating potentially violent
offenders from the innocent as “segregation” rather than “incapacitation” of
offenders. Such segregation of offenders not only sets them apart from “society”
physically—it also sets them apart from “society” expressively, by implying that
their welfare does not count as part of the social welfare. As punishment theorist
Sharon Dolovich observes, by excluding the offender from society both physically
and expressively mass incarceration treats the prisoner as “someone without moral
or political standing, someone outside the circle of humanity, to whom few if any
obligations are owed.”354 Physical separation is a powerful way to distance
ourselves emotionally from those on whom we infict suffering.355 Milgram and
Zimbardo have shown that the potential for such cruelty exists in all of us. Mass
incarceration is our Zimbardo experiment.
B. Community Effects of Incarceration
The costs of incarceration include collateral harm to the families and communities of prisoners. Incarceration rates vary dramatically across neighborhoods, some
losing substantial portions of their potential wage earners to prisons while other
neighborhoods in the same city lose almost none.356 The return of traumatized and
unemployable ex-prisoners to these neighborhoods creates additional risk of
violent crime.357
Often the families of offenders become incapacitated by proxy, losing capacity
for prosocial conduct. Incarceration dismantles family units. Marriage rates
decline.358 The education of children is affected negatively when a parent is
incarcerated.359 Children are more likely to offend if one of their parents is
incarcerated.360 The remaining parent becomes more likely to abuse or neglect
children, while research indicates that abuse or neglect increases a child’s risk of

redistribution of the risk they pose is justifed because it is a reasonable response to their fault in being dangerous
to their fellows, which status is incompatible with full membership in the social contract.”).
354. Dolovich, supra note 104, at 330–31.
355. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty & Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, Unconscious Infuences in Sentencing
Decisions: A Research Review of Psychological Sources of Disparity, 42 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 19, 29 (2010).
356. See Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 497.
357. See, e.g., id. at 514 (“[R]eturning prisoners are associated with a reduced capacity for collective effcacy,
the fostering of social situations conducive to criminal behavior, and higher levels of violent crime.”); Pritikin,
supra note 73, at 1082 (estimating that the criminogenic impact of parental incarceration increases crime by four
percent).
358. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 497.
359. See John Hagan & Holly Foster, Intergenerational Educational Effects of Mass Imprisonment in America,
85 SOC. EDUC., 259, 277–79 (2012).
360. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 493 (claiming high incarceration rates create criminogenic situations
in certain neighborhoods by disrupting social networks and local economy).

2017]

PENAL INCAPACITATION

47

juvenile arrest by 55% and increases the risk of committing a violent crime by
nearly twofold.361
Incarceration destabilizes local housing markets by removing income-earning
adults from their homes.362 Many single-parent households are unable to retain
their homes and are forced to “double-up” with other families or face homelessness.363 Constant parole revocation causes the “churning” of offenders into and out
of high-crime, low-income neighborhoods, and prevents the growth of stable
familial and community relationships.364 In turn, high-risk neighborhoods lack the
social capital and economic resources to effectively address local crime problems.365
A criminal history creates a stigma that makes even the most capable exoffender unlikely to fnd stable employment.366 Imprisonment often disrupts or
precludes education,367 and the scarcity of education and training in prisons does
not help. By one estimation, only one out of fve released offenders fnds stable
employment after leaving prison.368 Many state and federal laws render prisoners
ineligible for student loans.369 Even food stamps and basic forms of public
assistance are denied offenders.370 Meanwhile, pervasive criminal background
checks ensure that an offender’s sentence follows him to job interviews.371 Exiled
from the legal labor market, prisoners seek income and a restored sense of purpose
in illegal markets. In all these ways, incarceration begets incarceration by entrenching conditions of poverty and social exclusion.372 Sociologist Loic Wacquant
describes the result as a “carceral continuum which entraps a redundant population . . . who circulate in a closed circuit between its two poles in a self-

361. Shay Bilchik & Michael Nash, Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice: Two Sides of the Same Coin, JUV. &
FAM. JUST. TODAY (Fall 2008), http://cjjr.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Fall-08-NCJFCJ-Todayfeature1.pdf.
362. Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 509.
363. See generally Deborah M. Thompson, Breaking the Cycle of Poverty, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1209,
1210 n.3 (1998) (discussing the diffcult task of counting homeless youth and families, especially given the fact
that some families double up with other families and never enter a shelter).
364. See Drakulich et al., supra note 261, at 497 (discussing the effect of high incarceration rates on “the social
processes on which informal social control depends: participation in voluntary associations, feelings of
community solidarity, and neighboring activities”).
365. Id.
366. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 960–62 (2003).
367. See Hagan & Foster, supra note 359.
368. Christopher Stafford, Note, Finding Work: How to Approach the Intersection of Prisoner Reentry,
Employment, and Recidivism, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 261, 262 (2006).
369. See Nick Anderson, Advocates Push to Renew Pell Grants for Prisoners, Citing Benefts of Higher
Education, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/when-congress-cut-pellgrants-for-prisoners/2013/12/03/fedcabb2-5b94-11e3-a49b-90a0e156254b_story.html.
370. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 862(a) (2016) (barring federals benefts for persons convicted of a felony).
371. Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records,
20. J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 276–78 (2004).
372. See Dolovich, supra note 104, at 307 (“At a minimum, it seems clear that a system that responds to crime
with conditions certain to (re)produce antisocial behavior will fnd itself relying more and more heavily on a
carceral response.”).
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perpetuating cycle of social and legal marginality . . . .”373
In sum, incapacitation strategies predictably impose the costs of crime control,
not only on offenders, but on their families and neighborhoods. The result is to
broaden the class of expected offenders and to proliferate the spaces in which
crime risk is both concentrated and confned.374 That proponents of incapacitation
ignore these collateral consequences of incarceration suggests that they are
excluding entire communities from the social welfare calculus.
C. Permanent Exclusion as Denunciation
Life sentences for repeat offenders like the one upheld in Ewing v. California
cannot be justifed or understood as cost-effective ways to prevent violent crime.
Were effcient prevention the goal, prisoners would be released when they no
longer pose a threat to the general population.375 The relationship between crime
and age is well documented, most studies showing that criminal behavior declines
sharply as individuals reach their late twenties.376 “Aging inmates” (ffty years and
older) recidivate at less than half the rate as other former prisoners.377 Yet a Justice
Department report acknowledged that an inordinate number of elderly offenders
are incarcerated,378 largely as the result of incapacitative sentencing policies: the
elimination of parole and the introduction of mandatory minimums, and longer
sentences.379 The majority of these individuals pose no substantial threat to the
public, require health services not available in prisons, and cost the public far more
money to incarcerate than other prisoners.380 The predictable wastefulness of
lengthy recidivist sentences strongly suggests that they serve expressive rather
than instrumental purposes. They denounce recidivists as unworthy to participate
in society by permanently banishing them.
D. The Opportunity Costs of Incapacitation
A fourth way that incapacitation strategies express contempt for offenders and
their communities is by preferring costly and ineffective methods of crime control,
that harm them, over cheaper and more effective methods that would beneft them.
Such pro-social crime-preventive strategies are readily available. First, because

373. Loı̈c Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution: On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL
CRIMINOLOGY 377, 384 (2000).
374. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 240.
375. Robinson, supra note 82, at 1451.
376. See, e.g., id.
377. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, The Impact of an Aging Inmate Population on the
Federal Bureau of Prisons iii (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf.
378. Id. at 37, 42.
379. Id. at 3.
380. Id.
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crime is strongly associated with poverty, any policy that reduces poverty is also
likely to reduce violent crime.381 Other social welfare strategies shown to reduce
crime include prison education and job-training;382 prisoner reentry services;383
drug treatment programs;384 prison work release programs;385 cognitivebehavioral psychotherapy;386 realigning fnancial incentives for parole agencies to
achieve lower revocation rates;387 and reducing exposure to environmental toxins,
such as lead.388 It seems that proponents of incapacitation are willing to spend
public resources to confne potential offenders, but not to offer them rewarding
alternatives to crime. This perverse choice seems premised on the view that
providing such opportunity would reward them for their criminal dispositions.389
E. Incapacitation as Racial Segregation
As we have noted, mass incarceration segregates in the sense that it excludes
offenders and their communities from the social welfare calculus. Yet the disproportionately minority composition of the inmate population means that mass
incarceration also perpetuates an earlier history of racial segregation.390 The
emergence of a successful electoral politics of “law and order” immediately after
the civil rights movement’s successful campaign against de jure segregation
suggests that the resulting war on crime was also a reassertion of racial hierarchy.
The skewed racial composition of the large inmate population it produced supports
this interpretation. Thus, a Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that black men
were imprisoned at more than six times the rate of white men in the last quarter of

381. See generally Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 10 (1985) (indicating a direct correlation
between policies reducing poverty and those reducing violent crime).
382. John H. Esperian, The Effect of Prison Education Programs on Recidivism, 61 J. CORRECTIONAL EDUC.
316, 316–17 (2010).
383. Nora Wikoff et al., Recidivism among Participants of a Reentry Program for Prisoners Released Without
Supervision, 36.4 SOC. WORK RES. 289, 289 (2012).
384. Elizabeth J. Gifford et al., The Effects of Participation Level on Recidivism: A Study of Drug Treatment
Courts Using Propensity Score Matching, 9 SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, PREVENTION & POL’Y 40 (2014).
385. Grant Duwe, An Outcome Evaluation of a Prison Work Release Program: Estimating Its Effects on
Recidivism, Employment, and Cost Avoidance, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 531, 531–35 (2015).
386. Chris Hansen, Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions: Where They Come from and What They Do, 72 FED.
PROBATION 43, 43, 45–46 (2008).
387. VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE FUNDING: ALIGNING FISCAL AND OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PRODUCE MORE SAFETY AT LESS COST 2 (2012), http://www.vera.org/fles/performance-incentive-fundingreport.pdf.
388. See Drum, supra note 286.
389. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology, 49 N.Y. ST. B.J. 11, 22 (1977) (denying that
society lacks moral standing to punish if it fails to eradicate poverty, because crime is chosen rather than caused
by social conditions, and offenders rather than the public should bear the cost of crime control).
390. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010) (explaining the relationship between the
disproportional amount of minorities that are imprisoned and the history of early segregation).
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the twentieth century.391 About as many African American men are inmates today
as were slaves in 1850.392
In a regime that punishes on the basis of predicted dangerousness—literally
prejudice—cognitive biases make racial discrimination almost inevitable. If group
members are more likely to attribute blame to members of other groups, members
of minority groups are more likely to be blamed.393 The Just World Fallacy makes
us especially prone to blame those who are poorer and less fortunate. As Bernard
Harcourt has observed, in a regime where criminal history is the primary predictor
of dangerousness, the effect of any such racial discrimination will be compounded
again and again, making “risk . . . a proxy for race.”394
V. INCAPACITATION AND THE FUTURE OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPORTIONALITY
Penal incapacitation is based on fawed psychological assumptions that, in the
present state of knowledge, cannot be used to rationally select offenders for
incarceration. This circumstance may change, as the combined use of actuarial
assessment, clinical observation, neuroimaging, and genetics may improve our
ability to predict violence. Yet it is also possible that such scientifc advances will
enable therapeutic interventions that will obviate confnement as a means of
arresting that danger. We must also recognize that the methods of prediction
adopted by legislatures, sentencing judges, parole boards, and other offcials may
fall short of scientifc best practices. If prediction improves suffciently, truly
selective incapacitation may become possible and may be justifed as preventive in
some cases. We do not rule out the possibility that some practice of selective
incapacitation could withstand searching scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.
Yet such justifable incapacitation would probably be much smaller in scope than
our current apparatus of mass incarceration. Offcials might well conclude that

391. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S.
POPULATION, 1974–2001 56 (2003) (indicating that African Americans constitute 40% of the inmate population
despite making up only 13% of the general population); Leah Sakala, Breaking Down Mass Incarceration in the
2010 Census: State-By-State Incarceration Rates by Race/Ethnicity, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 28, 2014),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html.
392. Compare E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2014 29 app. tbl.3 (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf (“Percent of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of state or federal
correctional authorities, by age, sex, race, and Hispanic origin”) (indicating that there were 516,900 African
American male prisoners in federal or state facilities in 2014) and TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014 3 tbl.2 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf
(“Percent of inmates in local jails, by characteristics, midyear 2000 and 2005–2014”) (noting 85.3% of jail
inmates in 2014 were male) (noting that there were 263,800 African Americans in local jails in 2014) with U.S.
CENSUS, STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 90–91 tbl.83 (showing that there were 696,764 African
American male slaves age twenty and over in 1850).
393. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1433 (explaining FAE causes “observers systematically . . . to exaggerate
the degree of culpable wrongdoing” of offenders); see also Benforado & Hanson, supra note 298, at 326
(observing prejudice to minority defendants wrought by FAE).
394. Harcourt, supra note 201, at 237.
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such modest predictive success would not repay the effort and expertise required to
achieve it.
Barring substantial improvement in predictive success (unaccompanied by a
similar improvement in therapeutic success), how should our critique affect the
role of incapacitation in Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis? Recall that
in Ewing v. California the Court reasoned that California’s recidivist sentencing
statute embodied “a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that
offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to
commit felonies must be incapacitated.”395 Under Ewing, a rational belief that
incapacitating an offender improves public safety is enough to render the sentence
constitutional; the sentence need not be proportional to culpability, desert, or
deterrence.396
However, there is reason to doubt Ewing’s continued standing in Eighth
Amendment law, at least where an offender challenges the constitutionality of a
“sentencing practice” rather than an individual sentence. Recall that in Graham v.
Florida, which barred life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of
non-homicide offenses, the Court introduced an entirely new analysis derived from
its death penalty cases.397 Under Graham, the Court asks whether a national
consensus opposes the sentencing practice in question.398 If so, the Court independently compares the culpability of an offender with the severity of his punishment,
as well as the extent to which a sentence advances the penological justifcations of
punishment.399 Unlike Ewing, which required only that one justifcation be
advanced, Graham requires consideration of all four penological goals: rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.400 Indeed, the retributive injustice
of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide crime outweighed
whatever benefcial incapacitative effects could be expected, and the prospect for
juvenile rehabilitation weighed heavily against the dubious assumption that
Graham “would be a risk to society for the rest of his life.”401
Writing for the majority in Graham, Justice Kennedy distinguished previous
cases as challenges to particular sentences rather than to entire “sentencing
practices.”402 Yet this distinction is elusive.403 Assessment of the proportionality of
any particular sentence would seem to require comparison of like sentences for
like crimes, and perhaps consideration as to whether they have been committed by
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offenders with similar characteristics. It would seem that this analysis implicates
“a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have
committed a range of crimes.”404 Could not a defendant in Ewing’s position
challenge the “practice” of punishing nonviolent recidivists with life sentences?
Could not a defendant like Allen Harmelin challenge Michigan’s practice of life
imprisonment for frst time offenders convicted of drug possession?405 There is no
obvious reason why future defendants cannot trigger Graham’s more searching
proportionality review by simply proposing a categorical ban on the applicable
sentencing practice. And while Graham and Miller insisted that “children are
different” for Eighth Amendment purposes, they found age to be relevant only
because age bears on culpability.406 It would be strange to recognize culpability as
pertinent to desert and deterrence for juveniles but not adults. Thus it seems likely
that, in cases where a sentencing practice is challenged, Graham has revived the
retributive constraint on punishment that the Court neglected in Ewing.407
An alternative interpretation would be that the Court required justifcation of
juvenile life without parole by reference to desert and deterrence because rehabilitation is obviously not served by such a sentence, and incapacitation is a
particularly unconvincing rationale for permanently confning a juvenile whose
behavior should change with maturation. But if so, the Court has moved away
from deference to the felt imperatives of legislatures to incapacitate offenders they
fear. The Court now seems ready to require that such fears be justifed by empirical
evidence. Indeed, Graham and Miller do emphasize the importance of providing
404. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; see also O’Hear, supra note 403, at 3 (“But this distinction is not likely to prove
durable, because any Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence can be easily recharacterized as a challenge to a
practice.”).
405. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding sentence of life without parole for frst time
offender convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine).
406. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
407. See Lee, supra note 142, at 60. Note that the redistributive effects of incarceration create serious problems
even if the Eighth Amendment includes a retributive “side constraint.” Generally speaking, the fundamental
attribution error (“FAE”) will lead to excessive prison terms by causing courts and policymakers to overestimate
an offender’s causal role in provoking violence. See Dripps, supra note 233, at 1433 (“If culpability and
proportionality are likely to be applied badly in a retributive system, these concepts are just as vulnerable to FAE
when incorporated into utilitarian accounts as side-constraints.”). Further, once we acknowledge that certain
adverse social settings increase the likelihood of violence, it follows that such adverse situations can bear on
culpability. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal Law
Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten Social Background,” 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV.
53, 64 (2011). In other words, someone facing more powerful situational constraints will tend to be less culpable,
all else equal, than one in a more favorable situation. But because attribution biases cause us to ignore situational
factors or even blame the unfortunate for their bad luck, people facing adverse situations may be deemed more
culpable than more fortunate offenders who commit the same crime. This dynamic can create a problematic
distribution of sentences, arranged by socioeconomic status. While a retributive side constraint tolerates random
inconsistencies across sentences, it loses much of its normative appeal if it permits systematic unfairness in the
form of class-based sentencing. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69 (recognizing Eighth Amendment requires
consideration of background in juvenile offenders); Robinson, supra note 82, at 1442 (suggesting that desert does
not merely “operate at the extremes of disproportionality” but requires an “ordinal ranking of cases” in which
those less culpable receive lesser sentences).
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empirical support that a sentencing practice advances its articulated purpose.408
Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller noted the inability of science and
social science to predict which juvenile offenders are likely to continue offending
in the future, weakening the state’s incapacitation argument.409 On the other hand,
she found that neuroimaging and behavior psychology “show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds” such that “[the] actions [of juveniles] are
less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions
of adults.”410 In short, the state’s inability to forecast which offenders would
continue to threaten public safety in the distant future, together with the plaintiff’s
evidence regarding juvenile brain development, discredited the claim that Graham’s sentence rationally advanced the goal of incapacitation.411
Consider how Graham would apply to a practice of sentencing nonviolent
recidivists who have at least two prior “serious or violent” felonies to life
imprisonment. Under Graham’s frst prong, California could argue that similar
recidivist statutes have been enacted in many states, belying a national consensus
against the sentencing practice.412 But Justice Kennedy explained that statutory
authorization may be less important than “actual sentencing practices.”413 After
all, thirty-seven states and the federal government permitted life sentences without
parole for non-homicide offenses for juveniles in some cases, yet only an
estimated 129 juvenile offenders in the country were actually serving life sentences without parole, and only ffty-two outside of Florida.414 The Court also
compared this number with the total number of serious non-homicide offenses
committed by juveniles, to estimate the very low rate at which such sentences were
imposed in comparable cases.415 Certainly, a Ewing-like defendant could argue
that the vast majority of shoplifters do not receive life sentences, even those with
prior felony convictions. Would it not be “fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against” such a sentencing practice?416
A defendant like Ewing would likely satisfy Graham’s second prong. Studies
show that extremely long sentences have little or no positive incapacitative effect

408. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–70; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
409. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (reasoning that “[o]ur decisions rest[] not only on common sense—on what
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410. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 62.
413. Id. at 62–64.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 65–66 (articulating that “[a]lthough it is not certain how many of these numerous juvenile offenders
were eligible for life without parole sentences, . . . in proportion to the opportunities for its imposition, life
without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices
found to be cruel and unusual”).
416. Id. at 67 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
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on crime rates,417 whereas alternative crime-control approaches have gained
considerable traction.418 Given that actuarial predictions have been unable to
accurately predict violent recidivism, and that a law like California’s does not
restrict life sentences to offenders who can be shown empirically to pose a risk of
violence, it would be impossible to justify Ewing’s sentence as serving the purpose
of incapacitation. The obvious mismatch between Ewing’s culpability and his
sentence would preclude any judgment that a life sentence was necessary for desert
or deterrence. Thus, it appears diffcult after Graham and Miller to justify
imposing a life sentence on our hypothetical shoplifter. Nor would the Court have
to explicitly overrule Ewing, since Ewing did not frame his challenge as a
challenge to a sentencing practice, and offered no evidence showing the ineffectiveness of California’s three-strike law in selecting the demonstrably dangerous or
reducing crime.419
Perhaps Miller should be read to indicate that extremely long sentences, which
are analogous to death in that they are effectively life-destroying, may be imposed
for the sole purpose of incapacitation only after an individualized assessment of
incorrigibility is made.420 Since these life-ending sentences may violate desert,
while very few people are truly incorrigible, the state should be expected to
produce objective evidence of incorrigibility. When a state rests a sentence entirely
on a speculative prediction about an offender’s incapacity for change, it arguably
imposes a sentence that, “lacking any legitimate penological justifcation[,] is by
its nature disproportionate.”421
Moreover, there is something nonsensical about trying to justify lifelong
confnement on the basis of incapacitation. Incapacitation arguably implies an
exigent threat, not a threat that may or may not exist sometime in the future. The
Court hints at this point in Graham: “Here one cannot dispute that this defendant
posed an immediate risk . . . but it does not follow that he would be a risk to society
for the rest of his life.”422 Treating confnement for life as necessary on grounds of

417. See BRIAN BROWN & GREG JOLIVETTE, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A PRIMER: THREE STRIKES—THE
IMPACT AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE 33 (2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/3_Strikes/3_strikes_102005.pdf
(fnding no clear effect of the three-strikes law on public safety).
418. See, e.g., Alexandra Galassi et al., Therapeutic Community Treatment of an Inmate Population with
Substance Use Disorders: Post-Release Trends in Re-Arrest, Re-Incarceration, and Drug Misuse Relapse 12
INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 7059 (2015); Nkechi Taifa & Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to
Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283,
295 (2009) (“A variety of research demonstrates that investments in drug treatment, interventions with at-risk
families, and school completion programs are more cost-effective than expanded incarceration as crime control
measures.”).
419. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (No. 01-6978) (2002 WL
31120962) (arguing that “[t]he effectiveness of a state’s sentencing policy . . . is irrelevant for Eighth Amendment
purposes”); see O’Hear, supra note 141.
420. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012).
421. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71.
422. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
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incapacitation requires a view of the defendant’s behavior as entirely determined
by a permanently fxed disposition. This assumption is necessary only if incapacitation cannot call for periodic reevaluations of offender dangerousness.423 Prior to
the emergence of mass incarceration, offender dangerousness was periodically
assessed by parole boards, which viewed incapacitation as the inverse of rehabilitation.424 The notion that determinate sentences are necessary for incapacitation
refects an ideological rejection of rehabilitation that changes the meaning of
incapacitation from an empirically sensitive placement aimed at affecting consequences, to an expressively motivated attribution of depravity, aimed at distinguishing and excluding offenders from society.
Miller’s dissenters would reduce incapacitation to an inherent consequence of
imprisonment, which presumes that offenders would recidivate if unconfned, and
that crimes against inmates do not matter.425 This superfcial account of incapacitation would render proportionality a “nullity,” since all incarceration incapacitates
in that limited sense of the word.426 As a utilitarian justifcation for punishment,
however, incapacitation is satisfed not by simply confning an offender, but by the
more complicated task of making the world less violent. To meaningfully assess
incapacitation in this way requires considering the impact of a sentencing practice
on “an entire class of offenders.”427 Graham’s distinction between categorical and
individual challenges, while elusive, allows us to test incapacitation as a penological theory by asking more broadly whether a sentencing practice, applied to a
particular group of offenders, would actually achieve a net decrease in violent
crime. That is something Florida and Alabama did not do. To that end, Graham and
Miller suggest the Court is no longer willing to consign defendants to lifedestroying sentences on the basis of guesswork.428 The next state to defend a
sentencing practice on grounds of incapacitation will likely need to produce some
empirical evidence that imposing long sentences on a particular class of offenders
actually reduces violent crime overall.
Finally, Graham and Miller refect a new appreciation for situational constraints
on behavior. Courts must reckon with the moral signifcance of “environmental
vulnerabilities” that shape the lives of juvenile offenders.429 Under Miller, states
are constitutionally required to distinguish between “the child from a stable

423. See Robinson, supra note 82, at 1446 (“[I]f the justifcation for detention is dangerousness, then logically
the government ought to be required periodically to prove the detainee’s continuing dangerousness. If the
dangerousness disappears, so does the justifcation for detention.”).
424. Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of Failing to Admit Guilt at Parole
Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 498–501 (2008).
425. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (“If imprisonment does nothing else, it removes the criminal from the
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household and the child from a chaotic and abusive one” in imposing lifedestroying sentences.430 If Graham and Miller are to be taken seriously, courts and
policymakers may not deliver juvenile offenders into permanent exile without
considering the social context in which they committed their crimes. Extending the
same standard of decency to adult offenders is the next frontier of Eighth
Amendment sentencing proportionality.
CONCLUSION
Incapacitation of offenders has been an infuential goal of criminal justice policy
during the era of mass incarceration. While the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has accepted incapacitation alone as a justifying purpose for
recidivist sentencing enhancements, recent decisions have judged severe sentences
by reference to all purposes of punishment cumulatively, and have tested claims of
incapacitative benefts against empirical evidence. This Article has criticized
incapacitation theory as both theoretically and empirically fawed. We have seen
that incapacitation theory greatly underestimates situational factors contributing to
crime and over-attributes dangerousness to individuals. It also systematically
ignores crime committed in prison, implying that offenders deserve to be victimized. By assuming that criminality inheres in individual character, incapacitation
theory attributes blame to individuals for situational causes of misfortune. These
faws preclude incapacitation from rationally justifying lengthy recidivist sentence
enhancements as preventive, and suggest that such sentences cannot meet the more
demanding proportionality standard applied in recent Eighth Amendment cases.

430. Id. at 2467–68.

